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Domestic Sources in 1996
 Both theory
and empirical evidence suggest that among the leading domestic sources of any country's
foreign policy are the following elements: material and moral power to influence
events outside one's borders and, if necessary, to enforce one's choices; the nature
of the political regime and the world view that prevails in the polity, both of which
are expected to reinforce mutual responsiveness among similar regimes; and, the depth
of national unity among the members of the society, a point that logically acquires
greater significance in multi-national and multi-sectarian polities such as Turkey.
A review of these three
categories indicate that Turkey will face severe economic, social and political uncertainties
and instabilities in 1996 and possibly beyond, whose cumulative impact on foreign
policy cannot but be adverse. The following pages offer a brief overview of the developments
that inspire a rather gloomy outlook for 1996.
Mounting Economic Problems
A country's economic
strength is universally recognized as the single most important indicator of power
capable of supporting a state's foreign policy objectives. Military power is only
a function of the economic vitality and the underlying industrial-technological sophistication
of a country.
Turkish economic performance
in 1994 and 1995 does not leave much room for optimism about the prospects for 1996.
In 1994, Turkey was caught in a major economic crisis, registering 6 percent negative
growth and almost 150 percent inflation. Following some improvements in the first
half of 1995, by the end of the year macro-economic indicators were lopsided again.
In other words, as a World Bank official stated during his lecture at a Turkish University
in October 1995, the Turkish economy was almost back to where it had been at the
end of 1993.
Current political uncertainties
will most probably exacerbate the problems routinely faced by political cadres in
defining rational economic policies and using these to manage the economy. The pro-Islamic
Welfare Party (Refah Partisi-RP), which emerged from the recent general elections
as the leading party in parliament, entertains an economic philosophy that differs
in important respects from that followed by Turkey in the last decade. Privatization,
a most-coveted goal of the outgoing government, for example, is a policy that RP
dislikes intensely.
In fact the RP's key
position in Turkish politics today raises fundamental questions about the future
direction of Turkey's foreign economic relations, as it does for overall foreign
policy. For years, Professor Necmeddin Erbakan, the party leader, vowed to sever
Turkey's ties with all Western institutions and reorient them towards the Islamic
world. Most recently he objected to the signing of a Customs Union agreement with
the European Union (EU). In the two weeks following his victory at the polls, however,
Mr. Erbakan moderated his rhetoric, claiming that his opposition was directed not
at Customs Union itself but at some of the provisions that failed to properly serve
Turkish interests.
The element of uncertainty
in the country's political evolution could affect the economy negatively by scaring
away foreign investment. Designated by the US government as one of the world's ten
emerging markets, Turkey counted on increasing amounts of direct foreign investment
to facilitate its integration with the world economy. The spectre of an Islamic orientation
in Turkey could effectively keep foreign investment at bay, for the time being at
least.
Poor economic performance
inevitably has a negative effect on military power. The economic crisis in 1994 imposed
substantial cut-backs on defence allocations from the national budget, thus slowing
down the modernization project of the armed forces. The budding defense industry,
which had made significant progress through 1993 since its initiation in 1985 by
then Prime Minister Turgut Özal, has been crippled under the impact of the crisis.
In short, therefore,
the Turkish economy in 1996 will not be in a position to serve as an asset in support
of Turkish foreign policy objectives. Turkey's ability to exploit its military force
will be further constrained by the fact that the armed forces are tied down in a
struggle against Kurdish guerrillas in the southeast.
The Islamic Challenge and Politics in
Stalemate
 The secular
political system in Turkey is facing a serious challenge. The pro-Islamic RP has
espoused an anti-secular and anti-Western world view throughout its prior political
existence and captured the largest number of votes at the national elections held
on December 24.
Because it polled only
21 percent of the popular vote, the RP will not be in a position to form a majority
government and change the regime through constitutional amendment --at least not
until the next elections. Even if it remains in opposition, however, it will enjoy
sufficient power to obstruct the secular system that has been the bedrock of Turkish
modernization since the mid-1920s. Hence, the RP would be capable of forcing the
system into paralysis even if it is denied executive power as a result of maneuvering
by those modernist political parties in the parliament that are loyal to the regime.
The RP has consistently
advocated a clear anti-status quo foreign policy since its predecessor, the National
Salvation Party, was founded in the early part of the 1970s. Attacking traditional
pro-Western foreign policies, it pledged to sever Turkey's ties with NATO and other
institutions of the "Western Club". Instead, Turkey, under RP's leadership, would
turn to the Islamic world, promoting Islamic unity and bonding in a community of
the faithful. On the question of Cyprus in 1974, RP was uncompromising and continues
to be so.
However, there are
significant signs that indicate an intention to rethink many of the positions the
party dogmatically espoused over its quarter-century life span. The recent clarification
of the party position concerning the Customs Union with the EC might be the harbinger
of more clarifications, more changes to come. There is no question that this particular
move was an act of tactical compromise. Nevertheless, an RP approaching governmental
power would probably embark on a comprehensive review of its foreign policy posture
anyway, and would revise or eliminate several of its more radical positions. RP's
foreign policy plank comes from a tradition of cliches and jargon inspired in the
Sixties and Seventies by the anti-imperialist rhetoric of the Left.
Accordingly, the RP
should first and foremost be expected to soften, if not radically overhaul, its anti-Western
posture. In an era of world politics when, with the exception of Iran, Iraq and Libya,
all major Islamic countries seem intent on promoting good relations with the United
States, and nearly all Arab countries have reconciled themselves to peace with Israel,
the RP would certainly come to realize that dogmatic loyalty to a visibly anachronistic
foreign policy stance would result in the country's isolation. No political party
in power in Turkey could tolerate isolation from the world for long.
In view of the uncertainties
inspired by the possibility of severe political fragmentation, and the resulting
political stalemate, Turkey will be hard pressed to come up with the "best" foreign
policy that is conceivable and feasible. Shaky coalitions and the RP's power to obstruct
the government if it remains in opposition are not good omens for a well-thought
out, consistent and effective line in Turkey's approach to the world outside.
Finally, one needs
to ponder the response of Turkey's major Western allies and friends to likely changes.
Generally speaking, none would welcome the prospect of the re-Islamization of the
Turkish state and society in an era of post-communist world politics when Islam is
perceived in the West as a major threat. On the other hand, as democracies they should
be expected to accommodate a regime change effected through democratic means. A readiness
to live with an Islamic regime seems all the more likely if Turkish Islamists -who
are far from being an ideologically homogenous group- succeeded in desisting from
the temptation of an Iran-type regime domestically and categorical anti-Westernism
in foreign policy. Under an RP government, for example, one could anticipate the
replication of the US-Saudi Arabia model in U.S.-Turkish relations with one caveat,
however: that multi-party democracy remains largely intact. The RP's loyalty to multi-party
democracy will certainly be the single most important test for its acceptance by
Western democracies.
The response of the
EU, but more markedly of some member States might reflect a greater degree of apprehension.
For the victory of the Turkish Islamists raises the spectre, once again, of a relatively
large Islamic power at Europe's doors. On the other hand, Islamists' victory should
not come as a surprise to Western Europe. The EU agreed to a Customs Union with Turkey
in full awareness of the Islamists' advance to power. Hence, one should expect greater
vigilence on the part of the EC concerning the implementation of the Customs Union,
but not a sudden break in relations. The EU seems to have drawn important lessons
from the bloody conflict in Algeria and should be expected to act with restraint
towards an RP government. On the other hand, the question of Turkish entry into the
EU will be indefinitely postponed once again, or possibly be closed forever.
Ruptures in National Unity
Domestic cleavages
have a way of finding their way into foreign relations. In the Turkish case, the
Kurdish issue has nearly dominated Turkey's relations with its major allies and friends,
especially since the dismantling of the Berlin Wall. As the West emerged triumphant
from the Cold War, it pressed ever more aggressively for further democratization
and respect for human rights and minority rights. Turkey's allies and friends in
the West have viewed the Kurdish question largely through the prism of democratic
government and human rights. Turkey, in contrast, has tended to view it largely through
the lense of the principle of the territorial integrity of the state.
The fundamental incompatibility
between Turkish and Western approaches to the Kurdish question is inherently a world-order
issue that has pitted, at an accelerating rate in the post-Cold War era, the principle
of respect for human rights against the traditional state system. This has been especially
true in multi-ethnic societies where expressions of ethnic nationalism pose a potential
threat to the territorial integrity of the state, leading in turn to the suppression
of the right of expression. The inherent tension between the two priorities, e.g,
human rights and state rights, will continue to plague Turkey's relations with Western
democracies for some time to come.
The results of the
recent national elections give little cause for optimism that incoming coalition
governments will be strong and unified enough to adopt a new approach. The failure
of HADEP, a Kurdish party, to enter parliament will make progress towards a dialogue
considerably more difficult.
It seems highly likely
that, if left to internal dynamics alone, 1996 will be another lost year for initiating
the process of new thinking by the State about the Kurdish question. It also seems
likely, however, that the United States and the EU will sustain their pressure on
the government of Turkey.
The World and its Impact on Turkish
Foreign Policy
Turkey has traditionally
related to the world above all else through its relations with its neighbors (including
Russia), major European powers and the United States since 1945. The following pages
will offer a brief discussion of how Turkey's relations with some of these key actors
might evolve.
The United States
Turkish-American relations
will be heavily influenced by how the United States defines its world role. A Fortress
America would by definition reduce the level of its engagement worldwide, including
with Turkey. In early 1996, this seems a highly unlikely scenario, especially when
the leading, in fact the overpowering role of the United States in bringing about
the Dayton peace accord is recalled. One can safely argue, therefore, that the U.S.
will remain involved and engaged in this part of the world possibly more deeply than
it did in the early 1990s. If true, this would imply at a minimum business as usual,
that is, the continuation of American strategic interests in Turkey despite persistent
tensions over human rights issues.
The results of the
presidential elections in 1996 could put an end to the honeymoon if Robert Dole,
the most likely Republican candidate for the race, wins the presidency. The Republican
Party leader's outlook on Turkey might evolve in a more positive direction in particular
if a communist or an ultra-nationalist were to win the presidency next June in Russia
and threatened the continuation of the Russian program of reform.
The questions of Iraq
and Northern Iraq constitute the most serious source of tension between Turkey and
the United States. First of all, the Turks feel that Iraq should not be partitioned.
Second, the U.N. sanctions have hurt the Turkish economy, especially in southeastern
regions, by bringing official Turkish trade with Iraq to a halt. Like France and
Russia, Turkey has tried to persuade the United Nations to relax the sanctions, but
without success.
 Turkey is also extremely edgy about the consequences to itself of the
ambiguity in the status of Northern Iraq. The composition of the new Turkish parliament
could seriously restrict the ability of Turkish governments to continue to authorize
the deployment of Operation Provide Comfort at the İncirlik air base. The U.S.-led
allied force has aroused deep suspicion and antipathy in Turkey, leading the public
to believe that its very existence has encouraged the PKK(the Kurdistan Workers Party)
to improve its political organization and armed capability for operations against
Turkey. For Operation Provide Comfort to regain the confidence of the Turkish public,
the PKK needs to evacuate the scene. This force was originally designed to protect
the Iraqi Kurds against the forces of Saddam Hussein, not to provide sanctuary to
the PKK. So long as the Turkish public continues to perceive this contradiction,
no Turkish government could forever extend full support to the American policy towards
Iraq. The RP, The Democratic Left Party (DSP) and the Motherland Party(ANAP) have,
during the last couple of months, stepped up their criticism against the presence
of the force.
Russia
Turkish-Russian relations
have traversed a thorny path since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Mutually perceived
conficts of interest in the southern belt of the so called "near abroad" have introduced
an acute sense of rivalry into the bilateral relationship, making it a highly tense
relationship at best. In fact, both countries hold mirror images of each other.
In the four years since
the break-up of the Soviet Empire, Russia has managed by and large to reassert its
influence in the former Soviet republics in Central Asia and the Southern Caucasus.
In contrast, the initial Turkish enthusiasm for an hypothetical Turkic community
of nations has been frustrated primarily as a result of Moscow's skill in manipulating
to its advantage the old ties of economic dependence among the former republics.
None of this is new,
of course. On the contrary, it seems like a replay of the history of Turkish-Russian
relations. For example, Tsarist Russia was as suspicious of alleged Turkish support
of Sheikh Shamil of Chechnya in mid-nineteenth century as Russia is of Turkey today
over Dudayev's defiance of Moscow. In the spirit of a tit-for-tat strategy, Moscow
opens its arms to Kurdish activists, if not the PKK.
The violation of the
treaty on Conventional Forces in Europe (CFE) concerning weapons ceilings in the
area of the Caucasus, is explained by Moscow as a response to a new security situation
in the region. This is only half the truth, however. An equally strong motive is
to contain Turkish influence in the Southern and Northern Caucasus by maintaining
a superior military balance in the region. Russian-Georgian and Russian-Armenian
agreements have already provided Russia with several air and ground bases in each.
Put differently, Russian military power is back to where it was during the Soviet
era. Needless to say, Russian armed forces suffer from acute deficiencies in several
respects. Yet, the poor state of the military cannot be viewed as a reassurance against
conventional adventurism or nuclear blackmail. It is important to note that the Russian
press occasionally refers to the utility of tactical nuclear weapons in deterring
regional threats to Russian and allied security.
There are strong signs
that Russia is considering strategic cooperation with Greece on Turkey's west and
Iran on its east, again as part of a larger strategy of containing potential Turkish
influence in the Balkans and the Caucasus/Central Asian geopolitical space, more
or less the same terrain over which the two states competed in history.
Domestic developments
in both countries will have important implications for the future course of an already
strained relationship. The prospects of an Islamic party in power in Turkey, and
a communist or ultranationalist president in Russia cannot but magnify mutual suspicion
and harden positions.
The Caucasus, Iran and Iraq: An Emerging
Strategic Front
The post-Cold War era
has witnessed the transformation of the area from the Caucasus through Iran and Iraq
into one of the most important regions in Eurasia from the perspective of geopolitical
balances and strategic interests, including energy sources, of course, among actual
and potential great powers and the regional players. Clearly, the focal point of
critical tension has shifted from the Arab-Israeli conflict to the Caucasus-Iran-Iraq
geopolitical space.
The strategic interests
and objectives of the United States and Russia are inherently in conflict in this
new zone of tension, and will likely remain so as long as Iran and Iraq retain the
potential power to press for regional hegemony. The American dual-containment strategy;
the Russian nuclear deal and arms sales to Iran despite heavy American counterpressure;
tacit Russian support for Iran's emerging role in northern Iraq as a conterweight
to American influence; and a philosophically divergent view of the regime in Baghdad
-these are separate pieces of what seems like an evolving test of wills and interests
between Russia and the United States in an emerging geostrategic zone. The fact that
the US has returned to Europe at Dayton as the unchallenged peace broker in the Balkans
-traditionally among the most highly prized and feared geopolitical spaces around
Russia- explains the Russian interest in seeing Iran make headway in complicating
America's monopoly of power in northern Iraq.
This unfolding strategic
situation should be expected to reinforce the current American interest in keeping
Turkey engaged in its strategic purposes and priorities in this part of the world.
From the perspective of Washington, opposition to Saddam's Iraq and Teheran is a
vital and necessary element of such engagement by Turkey, an element which might
be difficult to sustain in the context of domestic developments, though not altogether
impossible.
The Peace Process in the Middle East
Turkey has already
been touched by the regional repercussions of the peace process. Turkish-Israeli
relations have been positively revived. Would the RP reverse this trend if it controlled
the government? Yes and no. Given the change in Arab states' attitudes towards Israel,
RP would find it difficult to shun relations with the "Zionist State". An RP government
should more reasonably be expected to take its cue from Saudi Arabia rather than
Iran, and pursue low-key bilateral diplomacy with Israel. In this context one can
safely argue that the peace process has been the landmine that has practically shattered
RP's time-honored foreign-policy vision of an Islamic Union that is to be set in
motion by an Islamic Turkey.
Growing Syrian assertiveness
on the "water issue" over the waters of the Euphrates River is the other major by-product
of the peace process. Generally speaking, the prospects of an impending peace with
Israel have bolstered Syria's confidence in its overall approach to Turkey. Against
this background, Syria can be expected to sustain the Arab diplomatic offensive on
the water issue which has already been set in motion, and back it up by a show of
force in tandem with increased security vis-a-vis Israel. The possible withdrawal
of part of the 40,000-strong Syrian army in Lebanon as part of the peace agreement
should be of great value in this respect. Syria has also been getting together with
Greece more frequently than ever before in recent history. Are these routine exchanges
or do they carry the seeds of an anti-Turkish entente? These are developments that
will need to be kept under close scrutiny by Turkish foreign policy makers in 1996.
That Syria will be
required to clear the Bekaa Valley of terrorist organizations like the PKK would
probably remain the only significant short-term bonus to Turkey from the pending
Syrian-Israeli peace.
Greece and Cyprus
Would the passing of
Prime Minister Andreas Papandreu from the political scene create a window of opportunity
for Turkish-Greek relations to make a fresh start? Most likely not. There are no
signs either in intellectual or in political circles in Greece of a desire to open
a new page or to rethink the relationship.
It is not clear yet
whether the latest American initiative to resolve the Cyprus conflict ahead of the
pending admission of the island into the EU is counting on the consent of Turkey.
A Turkish consent to a US-sponsored settlement would not be easily forthcoming, however,
unless it provides for the security that separate political existence has offered
to Turkish-Cypriots. To risk the security that has prevailed since the separation
of the communities in 1974 is not a step that any Turkish government would be prepared
to take easily. It is an irony that the then Prime Minister Mr. Ecevit and the then
Deputy Prime Minister Mr. Erbakan, who authorized the Turkish army's intervention
in Cyprus in 1974, are back in Turkish politics, once again as leading figures. Any
proposed peace plan would need to take this domestic situation into consideration.
Concluding Remarks
Turkish foreign policy
has been faced with a formidable challenge of adjustment both to internal and external
change in the post-Cold War era. This adjusment has been quite painful for several
reasons.
First, Turkey was not
prepared for the repercussions of the phasing out of the Cold War on the Turkish
society. As the "third wave" of democratization engulfed the world, ethnic and sectarian
demands severely challenged the status quo in Turkey, too. The ensuing tensions in
Turkish society, i.e. most critically around the Kurdish issue, found their way into
Turkish foreign policy simply because they involved the very values that Turkey's
Western allies and friends now asked the whole world to emulate.
Second, Turkey was
equally unprepared for the challenges of the new world that evolved around it: the
disintegration of the former Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia; the Gulf War and
its aftermath; and, the Arab-Israeli peace process. Improvisation and muddling-through
have become the main policy mechanisms by which Turkey has tried to respond to the
opportunities and risks, in themselves largely ambiguous, that the new world has
seemed to produce.
In the initial years
of the post-Cold War era, Turkish statesmen, encouraged by some well-known foreign
analysts, looked with pride and confidence to a new world in which Turkey would shine
as the "star" in Eurasia. Certainly, this was an overly exaggerated vision. Today,
most of that euphoria is gone.
On the other hand,
Turkey does have an enormous potential for growth and for a positive role in all
the three regions at the epicenter of which it sits. The precondition of such positive
growth seems to be the willingness and ability of Turkey to resolve the Kurdish issue
peacefully, rebuild national consensus and generate stable economic growth. Certainly
these are long-term commitments. The next few years will probably show more of the
same until and unless internal reform and reconciliation starts right away.
Equally critical for
Turkey's future evolution as a source of stability in an extremely unstable part
of the world will be the wisdom that Western Europe can muster in relation to Turkey.
Turkish democratization should be helped along, not through coercion and humiliation
but through the exercise of wise judgement.
Dr. Duygu Bazoğlu Sezer
Department of International Relations,
Bilkent University
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