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ex oriente lux
Rare and precious are
those moments that capture the mood of a country. Last summer's big, controversial
hit album by the "little sparrow" of Turkish popular music, Ms. Sezen Aksu, captured
the aspirations and the contradictions of Turkish society. The album, ex oriente
lux (the light rises from the east), was an attempt to find a musical synthesis that
drew upon the numerous cultural components, from east and west, that make up the
Turkish identity. At another level, the album's appeal can be located in its defiance.
The title of the album defied the ethnocentrism of the West of which Turkey wished
to be an equal partner on its own terms. The sense of pride invested in one's Turkness
turned increasingly chauvinistic as the celebrations of the national football team's
victories amply demonstrated. Against this background of aggressive nationalism and
the self-confidence of a society in search of its own proper synthesis, Turkish political
life resisted, the best it could, the calls for fundamental change. Yet, some important
changes to the constitution and to the anti-terrorism law were enacted by the parliament
after all the available byzantine games to block them were exhausted.
Order and chaos
 Turkish politics were on a rollercoaster
this year. Because of the inconclusive elections at the end of the year, a whirlwind
was 1995's legacy to 1996 that began rather inauspiciously. In 1995, some of the
reforms grudgingly endorsed by the National Assembly broadened the space for political
activity. Expediency, stemming from the desire to meet deadlines for European ratification
of the Customs Union(CU) with the European Union (EU) overcame the parliament's reluctance
to enact revisions of the Constitution. These revisions constituted significant,
if still insufficient, steps toward democratization. In September, an artificially
created cabinet crisis reshuffled the political deck. Following a rather farcical
process of government-formation that took place simultaneously with the largest strike
by public sector workers ever staged in Turkey, the country found a "new" government.
In the process, some old guard politicians who opposed Ms. Çiller were dismissed;
instead of confirming their divorce, Prime Minister Tansu Çiller's True Path
Party (DYP) and her junior coalition partner, the Republican People's Party(CHP)
patched up their differences and remarried; and finally, Ms. Çiller, agreeing
to hold early elections disregarded her vow never to leave office before her full-term
expired.
The old/new coalition's
political weakness and its dependence on patronage and the power of appointing people
to government positions, prevented it from rationalizing the economy and implementing
a full-fledged privatisation program. As a result, budget calculations based on substantial
privatisation revenues proved unrealistic. Consequently, whoever forms the government
in 1996 will shoulder the unappealing responsibility of implementing an austerity
program, provided that rational management of the economy and reigning in inflation
are serious goals. Nonetheless, both the recorded and the unrecorded economy demonstrated
their dynamism by surviving the debacle of 1994 and producing growth in 1995.
 The increasingly cacophonic debate on the Kurds -Turkey's most intractable
problem which casts a long shadow over both its domestic politics and its international
relations- intensified due to a series of spectacular developments. These included
the indictment of scores of intellectuals, the most notable of whom was Turkey's
best known author, Yaşar Kemal, who published a scathing attack on Republican
policies vis a vis the Kurds in the German weekly Der Spiegel. A prominent journalist,
Ahmet Altan, was also indicted and received a suspended sentence , on charges of
separatism under the infamous article 8 of the anti-terrorism law for writing a satirical
piece entitled "Atakürt". The law has since been watered down in a bid to quell
European criticism and ensure the European Parliament's ratification of Customs Union
with EU.
The Turkish media excelled
both in acting as the Fourth Estate and in sinking to new lows in self-destructive
mud-slinging. To its credit, the media courageously exposed corruption and focused
attention on Turkey's major problems by covering often controversial issues, particularly
in editorial columns. Frequently, though, the media seemed to compete with appliance
stores as the papers handed out household gifts in their bid to raise their circulation.
All pretense to journalistic objectivity and respect for professional codes were
thrown out the window both before and after the elections This exacerbated the credibility
crisis of the big press. The papers took sides by opting for one or another of the
political parties or factions. Private television stations continued to break taboos
in their efforts to gather news while radio stations proliferated with an infinite
selection of music and views.
In foreign policy the
past year was an extraordinarily busy and exciting one. Given the events in January
of the new year, the country may yet have an overdose of excitement in the coming
months as well. The Greek parliament's ratification of the Law of the Sea agreement
and Turkey's declaration that extension of Greece's continental shelf to 12 miles
would constitute casus belli sent shivers down the spines of the foreign policy bureaucracies
in allied capitals. A simple naval accident at the end of December unfolded to become
a major crisis of "sovereign rights" between the two countries thanks to hawkish
diplomats and politicians and the availability of easily manipulated, chauvinistic
and vain media institutions and personalities on both sides. Turkey and Greece came
to the brink of abyss over the "proprietorship" of a previously unheard of, barren
isle on which the Greek government sent troops. The sides whose navies faced one
another on the Aegean were subsequently told by the United States to cool off. The
crisis ended with a face-saving formula which was interpreted as a victory of resolve
in Turkey and a humiliating defeat in Greece.
The race to form a
Customs Union with the EU defined the foreign policy agenda while Turkey's human
rights record and restrictive political environment proved to be formidable impediments
towards that goal. The decision to admit Turkey in the Customs Union was approved
at the beginning of March after Greece's objections were overruled by her partners,
especially France and Germany. The American State Department worked as a close ally
of Turkey in this process, bearing significant pressure on reluctant members. The
agreement necessitated significant adaptation on the part of Turkey of its laws to
EU rules. In addition to the technical aspects of the agreement, Turkey was expected,
prior to the vote in parliament, to improve its human rights record, change article
8 of the anti-terror act and find ways for releasing the DEP (Democracy Party) deputies
convicted by the state security court to serve sentences of up to 15 years because
of their "treacherous" activities. After a long debate the European Parliament finally
gave its approval to the Union, with a substantial margin, in December.
Relations with Russia,
while economically vibrant, turned increasingly testy because of the intense competition
to control oil pipelines from the Caucasus and Central Asia. Real conflicts of interest
exist between the two countries and the political games were played quite publicly.
The issue that preoccupied the Turkish public most was the decision of the international
oil consortium concerning the route of the pipeline that would carry the "early production"
from the Caspian Sea to the world markets. Economic calculations, greatly enforced
by the strong American commitment to a Turkish route and tempered by the strategic
importance of the Russian Federation led to an even-handed decision to have two pipelines
that will go north and south from Georgia. Russia refused to abide by the limits
of the CFE agreement and on the watch of the United States and Turkey's other NATO
allies violated the limits set for its troops in the Caucasus.
In the Balkans Turkey
became an effective player again, thanks to US efforts to engage it in the region.
In the Middle East, Turkey's military operations in Northern Iraq provoked European
protest, but only a mild warning from the US administration. Turkish troops entered
northern Iraq twice in the year for large military operations to "eradicate terrorists
and to destroy their lairs". The first operation which engaged 35,000 troops took
place at the end of March and aimed at destroying the PKK infrastructure.
The Boiling Pot
Early in the year the
inimitable Ms. Çiller declared Newroz (the Kurdish new year), whose celebration
in previous years resulted in violence and death, a national holiday. The Turkish
military also chose that day to start its operations in northern Iraq against the
PKK (Kurdistan Workers Party) which had been conducting military operations against
military and civilian targets inside Turkey for over a decade and which orchestrated
acts of terror in urban centers.
Ms. Çiller was
also believed to be secretly behind the publication of the TOBB (Union of Chambers
and Bourses) report on the "Eastern Question" prepared by Professor Doğu Ergil.
The usually unimaginative leader of the Motherland Party (ANAP), Mr. Mesut Yılmaz,
chose to call this a CIA report. Much abused by a wide range of commentators some
of whom have a hard time acknowledging the existence of a Kurdish problem separate
and distinct from the PKK terror, Ergil's findings indicated that the Kurdish problem
is one of identity and of civic and political equality. The most reassuring finding
of the report for the future unity of Turkish society was the overwhelming preference
of the respondents to live in Turkey as Kurds. The concern with the spiralling social,
economic and political costs of the irresolution of the Kurdish problem also led
a prominent businessman, Mr. Sabancı, to publish his own book on the matter. Although
Sabancı's analysis was mainly economic, he was also on record a few weeks earlier
that the problem was not one that could be resolved solely by military measures and
that it required political demarches as well. Yet more support for the general findings
of Ergil's and his political position came from the nationalist trade union Türk
Metal in whose report, the desire of the Kurds to live in Turkey was reiterated.
An increasingly larger segment of the population seems to give serious consideration
to political options in the resolution of the Kurdish problem in spite of the general
prevalence of strong nationalist sentiments in the country at large.
Another cleavage in
Turkish society flared up in a number of occasions this year. The careless comment
by a TV comedian who used a pejorative term for the minority Alevi sect in Turkey
brought stones, fire and fury to the television station which broadcast the program.
In another instance, the random killing of a patron at a coffeehouse in a predominantly
Alevi district by gunfire from a taxi cab and the mishandling of the reaction to
the incident by the police resulted in the spread of violence. Ultimately controlled
by the army, the violence jumped to neighborhoods on both sides of the Bosporus and
in certain places turned into sectarian battles with the death toll reaching 20 by
the time calm was restored. The relations have been incendiary between the Alevis
and Sunni fanatics especially since the abominable burning of a hotel in Sivas two
years ago. The relatively lenient sentences for the guilty at the end of the trial
in this case and the court's tolerance for the provocations of the convicts also
generated a heated reaction both among Alevis and in secular communities. On the
eve of elections the government took decisions that recognized Alevi grievances and
allocated TL 3 trillion to the community for its religious needs.
Finally, public servants
in the bureaucracy protested their meagre salaries and the workers in the public
sector industries went on strike. The strike that began on the day the coalition
broke up suddenly brought Türk-İş, the main labor confederation, to the
fore of the political stage. Although the workers (and the public servants) got their
raises, thanks to upcoming elections, Türk-İş may have overplayed its
hand as the general public, that has to pay for the price hikes that would ensue,
turns increasingly sour against "privileged" strata.
The Incredible Shrinking Center
Turkey went to the
polls at the end of the year in the midst of political fragmentation spiced by an
uncivic discourse. The electoral law was unfair, the principle of representation
was given short shrift and the rush in calling the elections prevented a few million
voters from exercising their right to vote. The substantial erosion of the traditional
political center in Turkey, which the election results reaffirmed, framed the fierceness
of the political battles between both the parties and the leaders of the center.
The election results
were disappointing foll all parties with the possible exception of Ms. Çiller's
DYP. Although it is impossible to know exactly what the voters wanted, the high turnout
and the distribution of the votes among systemic parties underscored the fundamental
faith of the electorate in the democratic system. The unreasonably high electoral
threshold caused the exclusion of the Turkish nationalist MHP and the Kurdish nationalist
HADEP from the National Assembly. The contrast between the overwhelming support given
to HADEP in the southeastern regions of the country and the low level of support
in Western cities with large concentrations of ethnic Kurds was noticeable. Following
the elections, the pro-Islamic Welfare Party(RP) became a model of pragmatic conciliation
as it substantially toned down its rhetoric, stopped its objection to the CU and
even appeared to acquiesce to the reality of an economic system with interest payments
that Islam proscribes. As the review goes to press Turkey seemed to be faced with
three alternatives: An RP-ANAP coalition, a DYP-ANAP coalition or new elections which
might be called even if a government is formed now.
The year started quite
turbulently. Prison strikes, assassinations, "boat-jacking"of a ferry full of Russian
passengers punctuated the month of January.
Mr. Özdemir Sabancı,
a lover of cars and the architect of the Sabancı-Toyota cooperation, was murdered
along with the general manager of Toyota's Turkish plant, Haluk Görgün
and an executive secretary, Ms. Nilgün Hasefe on the 25th floor of the top-security
Sabancı Center. At about the same time, a journalist, Metin Göktepe, covering
a burial ceremony died in police custody. The public reacted strongly to both incidents.
TÜSİAD, along with others, reaffirmed its commitment to the democratic order
and called for the apprehension of Mr. Göktepe's killers.
As the Customs Union
took effect, the Turks went about their business as usual, the markets remained calm
throughout all the domestic and international crises and the real need for a government
began to be called to question, jokingly of course. |
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