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 As the century draws to a close, Turkey
is undergoing a process of self-discovery. It has already taken the first steps towards
perceiving itself as it is, rather than as it wants to be. Until the late 1980s,
the country's agenda, as well as the language and concepts used in discussing this,
was to a great extent determined by those in control of politics and the state. The
present decade however witnessed an important change: Turkish society in all its
diversity started to set the agenda.
Civil society gained
ground and the state regressed. Deruralization continued and educational levels improved.
Wider segments of the population began to connect the fragments of the world in which
they lived. For nearly half a century, the struggle for democracy continued, despite
interruptions. Democratic rule meant that popular interests would be represented
and popular demands would be met. In their daily lives, the citizens could observe
the advantages of democracy compared to periods of restrictive government. Rapid
developments in communications helped them see the real balance of forces in countries
where people are the "masters". The state however was not equipped to meet contemporary
demands. It could not administer justice efficiently and reliably; nor did it appear
capable of keeping its promises of health or retirement support anymore. Left to
their own devices, the members of the lower social classes had to look after their
own survival; they tried to meet their housing needs with shanties, transportation
with collective taxis. Members of the upper classes had, in the meantime, reached
a certain level of development; some, for instance, succeeded in attaining world
standards in industrial enterprises. For the first category of people the state was
now a brutal, domineering entity that did not keep its promises. For the second category
the state's importance had diminished. A considerable market independent of government
contracts developed. Therefore, the state was no longer the "big boss" whose every
request had to be accepted unconditionally. As a result, Turkish society, with all
its constituent parts, set out to redefine itself and to put this new self-definition
into words.
Society and self-definition
 The quest for verbalization is part
of centrifugal tendencies within the system. In Turkey, as in most parts of the world,
the nation-state claimed to be the only conveyor of modernization and brake on the
centrifugal tendencies (ethnic, religious, national differences) of its citizens.
Now that the structures upon which the legitimacy of the nation-state rests are breaking
up, these centrifugal tendencies are pulling open the cracks.
Economic integration
on a world scale brought about disintegration on other levels. This, in turn, means
that differences and not similarities take the lead in the formation of identities.
The search for a new identity brings forth non-national affinities. It emphasizes
membership to religious communities in some cases and in others, seeks to place subnational
regionalism at the center of the sense of belonging. In both cases, the movement
is away from the plane where the nation-state stands.
In determining their
course, these new strategies conflict with the official code of citizenship, effective
since the beginning of the Republic. Since its foundation, the Republican state defined
citizenship more broadly than just along political lines; it has enforced political
citizenship to make the individual part of the national-ethnic culture. In the crisis
ridden context of the 1990s, this enforcement takes on a quality of despotism and
engenders a growing reaction. This produced a series of counter-reactions. Conservatism
emerged as a dominant force in politics. Füsun Üstel observes that at the
close of the century, "in a setting where identities are culturally oppressed, political
rights are being articulated as cultural demands."
Those who speak up
produce their self-definition from their socio-cultural background. Consequently,
cultural issues begin to dominate the public sphere that used to be occupied by political
concerns until the beginning of the decade. The public sphere, formed by intellectual
discussions conveyed by the media is now ruled by cultural issues.
Turkish society is
simultaneously inventing and discovering its multiplicity and its diversity.
The media on stage
 The mass media plays a leading role
in the emergent self-awareness of Turkish society, as well as in its search for self-definition.
It has made a great contribution to the sensitization of society to issues such as
democracy, rights and liberties. It has facilitated the probing of political, cultural
and sexual subjects that were not and could not be brought out in the open until
very recently.
The first steps in
this direction were taken in the '80s; between 1980 and 1990, communications in Turkey
underwent radical changes. A number of new papers were published, the first private
TV channel was launched, the telecommunications infrastructure was considerably developed
and satellite links became part of daily life.
The Turkish press faced
many political and economic obstacles in the 80s, mainly of a political nature. The
military government that ruled the country till 1983 applied severe censorship. To
avoid being closed down the newspapers restrained themselves. Readers tended to shy
away from the political polarization that was characteristic of the period before
the coup. All of these induced the press to turn to social subjects and "high society"
news.
The period between
1980 and 1990 was one of diversification for the weeklies as well. New magazines
such as Aktüel, Tempo and Nokta began emphasizing daily life, environmental,
women's and youth issues as well as politics. Many periodicals specializing in economic
subjects were published. Publications targeting women boomed, as did publications
in specialized fields such as computers. Another example of press diversification
in this period was the publication of two newspapers that targeted the Islamic community:
Türkiye and Zaman. They were followed by a myriad of weeklies on the same vein.
The battle to break
the state monopoly in TV broadcasting, which started in 1990 with the appearance
of a non-legal private channel, Magic Box, produced swift results. A multitude of
private radio stations and TV channels followed suit. During September 1994 alone,
a total of 70 radio-TV companies were formed in 25 provinces and 18 counties. There
were an estimated 2000 radio stations at this time, and 400 TV channels.
The approach brought
to broadcasting by the new TV channels emulated new fashions in the West and was
very different from what Turkish society was accustomed to. In the previous era of
broadcasting, audiences were treated as students, while the TV professionals played
the teachers. This pedagogical communication had three main features: 1- The communication
of information; 2- The orientation and ‘rectification' of minds; 3- A hierarchy and
separation of roles: on one side those who held information, and on the other viewers
to whom this information was given.
The new concept in
broadcasting gave priority to teasing the viewer, encouraging him to interact with
the medium. Turkey's new private channels adopted this same approach right from the
start. The number of talk shows and discussions increased rapidly and continues to
do so.
This boom may be due
to the relatively low production cost of such shows but we also have to acknowledge
the fact that Turkish society is fascinated by this "communicational environment".
Discussions can carry on for over 8 hours; the viewers persist in watching talk shows
until daybreak. Particularly during these unedited live shows Turkish society exposes
its full diversity.
Yet for all this the
Turkish public does not trust the media. For instance, on the night of March 26,
1995, the show "Duvar" on Kanal 6, conducted a telephone poll. To the question "Do
you have confidence in the media?" only 6.37% of those who called gave an affirmative
answer; 93.63% did not trust the media.
Violent fluctuations
in the circulation figures of the Turkish press are another manifestation of this
mistrust. Turkish newspapers double their circulation through promotions; but as
soon as they stop these practices their circulation drops abruptly back to the starting
point. Yet their technological infrastructure is top of the line, the quality of
their print meets the highest world standards and last but not least, the media does
make a serious effort to feel the pulse of the public.
The media take the
lead in the self-awareness process of society, but is considered questionable by
this same society. Is society blaming the mirror holder, then, when it doesn't like
the image it sees? I think not. In addition to reflecting the diversity of society,
the media also speaks for society and this constitutes the main reason for the uneasiness
of the public. The reader/viewer is caught up in conflicting sensations. The media
makes it understood that it, too, is one of the forces—along with the government
and the army— that govern the nation. Furthemore, it gets this power from speaking
on behalf of society, and even in its stead. Whereas certain sections of society
still cannot speak up, without fearing for themselves, the media is loudly vocal
but in a self-determined way and proportion. This is reflected in the headlines and
in the balance of news distribution. People see the media as their spokesman for
their own troubles and sometimes as the remedy for them. The media emphasizes the
search for solutions so as to encourage this perception. It assumes the duty of the
judiciary and often arbitrarily judges the crime and the criminal without waiting
for the legal verdict; in some cases where it passes judgement without reliable evidence,
the persons concerned are seriously injured. The media fill in the gaps left by institutions
of education, publishing examination questions and answers, etc. The media, having
decided that a political party is not active enough, assume the work of the party.
But, it does not have to account for anything as a political party does, for it does
not participate in elections. In short, it acts as an authority without responsibility.
It often pushes its irresponsibility to the limit of insolence. It is hard to say,
in an environment where various groups cannot give voice to their opinions, that
these groups are always glad to have the media speak up for them. Hence, the media
arouse as much discontent as interest.
The media define our identities/they
transform them in the course of definitions
The most tangible instrument
of the modern world—the media—also enhances values rooted in the premodern period,
characteristics nourished by what is local. This search for identity both formalizes
and diffuses these values. The most striking example of this process can be found
in the Islamic movement.
Nevertheless, the media
have one particular effect that shapes the whole of society in the same way. This
calls for a closer look. To do this, it will be helpful to review the formation of
the "sense of belonging" that shapes cultural identity groups.
Certain conditions
are necessary for a sense of belonging to surface and then to continue to exist.
A sense of belonging is, above all, closely related to shared experiences exclusive
to a group. A principal experience is "information"-about conduct, custom and tradition-
that members of other groups cannot have access to.
Another dimension that
helps consolidate a group identity is usually a shared physical location that is
specific to the group and that is generally closed to members of other identity groups.
This means being familiar with and being an inhabitant, in short, the "owner" of
those places. This is the privilege of jointly using those locations. The group's
shared physical location specifies the group's common point of view, its perspective.
A country seen from the East appears different from the same country seen from the
West. A city perceived from a poor neighborhood is certainly different from the same
city perceived from its center.
One dynamic force that
creates and nourishes the sense of belonging of an identity group is that the private
aspect, the aspect behind the scene, is visible only to the members of that group.
The face presented to the public is different from that known within the group, which
is usually full of conflicts and vulnerabilities. The saying "the broken arm stays
in the sleeve" is a laconic formulation of this dynamic. The sense of belonging is
strengthened by jointly hiding the secret face of the inner working of the group.
Keeping in mind these
common dynamics let us turn now to the boost in communication experienced in Turkey
in the 1990s. Let us take a look at the impact of the media on the search for identity.
At the same time, let us not forget that this is a process where media and society
mutually transform each other.
Media bring together
all age groups: people with different levels of education, with different professions,
members of different ethnic groups, of different religious communities, different
social classes in an "information pool": This pool is more or less the same for all
of them. Each cultural group sees, learns about, knows of the other groups at the
same time, in the same manner, by the same aspects. For example the "Cem" service
of the "Alevis" is seen by everyone and the Alevis themselves watch everyone else's
"services".
The media continually
visit social locations. It discloses the private aspect of each identity group to
us. This was previously open only to its own members. How seeing the private lives
of other identity groups affect us, in turn, depends on whether our former "feelings"
about the group were positive or negative. We discover that those we formerly saw
as superior to ourselves are ordinary just like us; their arrogance is no longer
justified, their privileges are no longer legitimate. Or when we see that the members
of a cultural group we had negative impressions of, and even feared and resented,
actually have weaknesses, emotions, etc. just like us, the expectation of a threat
attributable to them diminishes.
All of these interact
to create a form of "new mass majority" . The experience of shared information builds
a shared imagination, a shared pool of belonging. Groups which previously felt ignored,
demand equal rights. They expect to be treated like everyone else. Since the majority
now includes everyone they do not accept to different treatment.
Integration at the
level of infor-mation also makes social integration desirable, openly for some and
secretly for others. However, the real tension starts exactly at this point. The
desire for integration does not secure its realization. Those who have been enjoying
privileged statuses resist the demands for inclusion engendered by this "common universe
of information" and this "pool of common sensitivities". The former masters do not
readily open the social and physical locations they have always considered to be
their exclusive domain. The appearance of a common universe of information does not
immediately lead to social harmony and further integration. It increases discontent,
feelings of isolation, tension and conflict. Turkey is now passing through this phase.
Ferhat Kentel states
that "the lack of confidence due to unfavorable conditions... generates fear. This
fear enhances the need to find refuge in a sense of belonging. A defensive identity
surfaces...These new identities rest upon a negative definition of ‘the other'. Therefore
the differentiated identities situated against the totalistic ideologies reach the
conviction that they hold the absolute truth."
The state's barriers
against any open activity, self-expression and organization that does not conform
with its own view of cultural ethnic and religious identity contributes to the agitation.
The permit for a foundation may be delayed for years because the word "Alevi" is
mentioned in the title deed. Attempts at research and publicity on Kurdish culture
are thwarted. Demands that could be solved by civil society in a normal political
environment, alter course because of legal obstructions, and turn to political society.
Attempts to form an "Alevi" party, a Kurdish party etc. increase. As I specified
earlier, the public sphere then gets monopolized by the cultural issue.
The Year 2000 and beyond
 To be realistic, in the short run,
let us say until the year 2000, we cannot expect a reversal of the present trend.
Until then, the pain will just get worse. Nevertheless, we can be sure that at the
same time another trend will be quietly treading its way, like a mole advancing under
the earth and suddenly raising its head. It appears that the Customs Union with Europe
will have the greatest impact on this process. Customs Union wll help bring closer
the as yet distant fence around the "pool of information". The CU will necessitate
compliance with European Community standards in the social and economic arena. We
will witness the expansion and diffusion of democratic rights and freedoms that will
make the individual stronger before administrative, political and economic power
groups. Cultural demands will be more readily met. It must however be expected that
those liable to be hurt by the CU (such as small-scale retailers and manufacturers)
will vent their anger by joining the isolated, introvert communities. Thus, it would
be overly optimistic to suggest that the bifurcated picture of Turkey will fade away
soon.
In the long run, depending
on the international conjuncture, we should not be surprised if a course is taken
similar to the one followed in the transformation of the Turkish musical scene.
Turkish music was dominated
by "Arabesque" in the second half of the 70s and through the 80s. Arabesque music
found its themes in oriental culture and put "melancholy" at its center. Yet it made
use of the sound and color of western musical instruments. This was a musical sensitivity
rooted in the East that carryed the traces of the West on its back. Arabesque regressed
in the 90s and made way for a new phenomenon. We experienced a veritable explosion
in Turkish popular music. The themes of popular music are everyday, drawn from the
Western aspects of life; when there is melancholy in it, it is a "moment" rather
than a "climate". There is just enough of the East to fulfill the function of suggestion,
with undulating curves. In short, today's popular music is rooted in the West and
carries the traces of the East on its back. This is the hint for the shape Turkey
will take in the long run.
Dr. Aydın Uğur
Department of Public Administration,
Marmara University
Bibliography
1) Kentel, Ferhat,
"The whirlwind of Totalitarianism and the Average Turk's Identity", Yeni Yüzyıl,
December 15, 1995
2)Meyrowitz, Joshua,
No Sense of Place, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1985)
3) Uğur, Aydın,
Undiscovered Continent, (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1991)
4) Üstel, Füsun
"Citizenship as a form of belonging or two (and a half) interpretations of citizenship",
Mimeo, Tarabya, 1995
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