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 Two
centuries of westernization and decades of radical policies in favor of secularism
make Turkey the first–and up to now probably the only–Muslim country where a total
separation of the political and the sacred has been implemented with success. Yet
today, we are witnessing the resurgence of Islam and its pervasive influence in all
spheres of the social and political arena.
The Kemalist reformers
who founded the Republic thought that secularism had to be be the pillar of the new
regime. Religion, and not only Islam, was considered to be a force capable of shaping
minds and souls. The secularizing elite contended that although religion in general
and Islam in particular represented the main source of meaningfulness for individuals,
they had to be pulled out of the public sphere.
Islam, a religion with
explicit political claims and precepts, was decreed to be a matter of personal and
individual concern only. The new Republican state thought that the embryonic civil
society had to be watched and kept under surveillance in order for it to remain docile
and subdued. Kemalist elites were to be the custodians of such political correctness.
They duly applied their new approach to state structures, adopted a modern constitution
and succesfully created the first secularist state in a Muslim society.
Turkish Islam, once
a central pillar of life was now a mere legacy for the rural masses and the urban
underprivileged. It was relegated to Anatolia, the repository of religious and mystical
traditions. Banished from the public sphere, proscribed from political lif, Islam
was pushed to the background of Turkish society. Once it was removed from the center
to the periphery, Islam became the exclusive property of the latter.
The question still
remained as to whether, having been rejected from the political sphere, Islam had
also vanished from the people's conscience? It soon became apparent that Islam, having
been banned by the ruling class, emerged very quickly as an issue of political competition
and gain for social actors. Religious orders and brotherhoods inspired by Muslim
mysticism, as well as new religious communities, continued to have a strong hold
over the rural population. They kept on recruiting new followers from among the masses,
who were still very sensitive to esoteric symbolism. The appeal of the religious
orders, such as the Kadiris and the Nakshibendis, to mention only two, was due to
the dissatisfaction or frustration generated by the "irreligiousness" of the Kemalist
state. At the same time, this sensitivity was an expression of social and cultural
protest: the protest of those who once defined themselves within the framework of
Islamic culture and who intended to continue to do so. This sensitivity also reflected
concern and resentment created by the invasion of Western mores and habits which
threatened to erode their cultural identity.
 From the multi-party system to the slow but visible industrialization,
to new ways of being and social behaviour, everything was now occurring under the
auspices of a new model and new codes that were inspired by the West. For decades,
though, the secular project was unchallenged. The twin purposes of the Kemalist Republic,
"Westernization" and "Development" co-existed and delivered their promises. Increasing
rates of rapid urbanization combined with the maturing of the strictly secularist
regime and the differentiated nature of a modernizing society changed the political
parameters by the late 1980s.
The Roots of the Islamic Protest
The peripheral protest
stemmed from the belief that it was impossible to combine Western institutions with
what they thought stood for their identity, with what was at the heart of their own
culture. It expressed the will to return to the source; the will to encounter once
again the moral serenity and peace that only Islamic ways can confer; the wish to
recover the glory of the Prophet's time. Social discontent was disguised as nostalgic
religiousness. It was expressed through the quest for a more Islamic existence. The
discontent of those who sought more prosperity and more justice was driven by an
Islamic discourse and terminology. Such an idiom had a force to mobilize since it
was better known and more deeply rooted in the minds of millions among rural classes
and their migrating fellows, the urban poor.
How many are the followers
of the historical "tarikats"(religious orders)? What is the real number of the followers
and members of the more recent Islamic schools and communities? Since these organizations,
are neither completely legal nor really illegal, and as they do not operate like
modern political parties with membership lists, it is difficult to accurately estimate
their demographic weight in Turkish society. Yet, even a casual observer of Turkish
life, whether political or social, over the last decade could note the extraordinary
growth of associations, societies and foundations. Each of these have a multitude
of publications and periodicals; they organize activities and penetrate all levels
of Turkish society. They all claim to uphold Islamic views and ideals. In short,
even a cursory review of these multiplying organizations should lead us to the conclusion
that their vitality is, both quantitavely and qualitatively, the most conspicuous
in present-day Turkey.
In my opinion, Mr.
Erbakan's Welfare Party(Refah Partisi-RP) is but one example of the many full- blown
or less structured Islamic organizations that can be found in Turkish society today.
The RP represents Islamic longings at their most political. It also functions as
a catalyst in the public and the political spheres for some of the discontented Muslim
believers. It therefore has greater visibility, if not greater impact, and is consequently
conferred greater importance by analysts at home and abroad as well as the Turkish
political class.
 The ideological and sociological origins of this religious party go
back to the period when Turkey stepped into a multi-party system. With the advent
of the competitive party system, Islam made itself more audible in the political
and religious circles. It began to show signs of a resurgence, if not a renaissance.
The new forms of political participation, derived from parliamentarianism, inspired
the search for a new model to integrate the center and the periphery, without which
the co-existence of these two poles did not seem easy. How was it going to be possible
to lure the periphery and to recruit it to participate in politics if its relation
to the religious sentiment was ignored or restricted? How was it going to be possible
to incorporate and activate the periphery without promising the restoration of Islam
within democracy?
That was the beginning
of a long and thorny road in Turkey, hesitant in its contemporary socio-political
identity. The country was to be caught in a dichotomous debate of "more Kemalism-less
Islam" vs. "less Kemalism-more Islam". Turkey fluctuated between radical secularism,
intent on ousting religion from public life, and a more understanding secular attitude
professing a permissive attitude towards Islamic life styles and political behavior.
It was an incessant va-et-vient, punctuated by military coups and interventions,
and giving way to political instability and unrest.
It behooves sociologists
to inquire whether the revival of Islam in Turkey, this proliferation of political-religious
movements and groups, is a political rejection of the existing system. Or is this
merely a response to the perceived danger of the contamination of Turkish society
by Western materialism? In other words, are the millions of Islamic voters (not only
and exclusively supporters of RP), simply trying to "hold fast to the rope of God"
as the Koran admonishes? Are they doing this in search of an adequate answer and
as a reaction to the deterioration of their cultural values under the politics of
Westernism advocated by the power elite? Is it correct to reduce this new religiosity
to a psychological reaction?
Here we should draw
attention to the fact that the revival, if we may call it thus, of religious orders
and the emergence of political protest movements, first started in regions with higher
levels of economic development. These are the areas where industrialization has more
deeply affected social habits and thus confused people's hearts and souls. Economic
integration, as well as the swing to an urban and capitalistic society, often leads
to social crisis. The individuals of the peripheric strata come to the realization
that they belong to a society within which they are condemned to the bottom rung
of the ladder as long as their social mobility is blocked. The modern state created
the myth of development. Therefore, we can argue that recourse to religion is the
response to the gap between daily economic reality and the myth of development that
the state has propagated. The lack of success in equitably distributing economic
prosperity is undoubtedly the most relevant factor for the disinherited social categories.
It leads to indifference and dislike, if not sheer alienation and visceral opposition
to the political regime.
Transformations induced
by the Kemalist state gave way to expectations of earthly fullfilment and the quest
for a better life. Aspirations turned into social hopes, and hope is, as the poet
puts it, "a violent feeling". It can also be the ingredient for violence itself.
The question arises then, if hope, in the Turkish case, can engender a socio-political
revolution as has been the case in the Third World or in Southern societies, in Muslim
areas in particular. For a variety of reasons my answer to this question, which seems
to create so much anxiety and turmoil in national and international political circles,
is negative.
In the first place,
the Sunni population in Turkey, among whom the rise of Islamic politics is most noticable,
has little affinity with what is wrongly called ‘fundamentalism'. Sunni Islam, even
its so-called fundamentalist varieties, does not permit the existence of a class
of clergy that can turn itself into an autonomous institution with a highly structural
and bureaucratic hierarchy that is capable of challenging or confronting the state.
My negative answer is also based on the fact that the Alevi version of Turkish Islam
has perpetuated its ancestral aversion to political power based on religion. The
Alevis have always declared an open and often militant preference for Kemalist secularism.
This is, for them, the only counterweight against the reappearance of Sunni hegemony
that is historically prone to suppress them.
 The struggle
between secularist radicals and Islamists on the one hand, the dissent and polarization
that exist within the religious groups themselves on the other, may yet give way
to intermittent acts of political violence. But the nature of the Turkish political
system, and the historical specificity of Turkish Islam, are still, in the context
of the present international conjuncture, prominent factors for stability and constitute
effective barriers against a hypothetical collapse of the system. There is no doubt
that the ongoing process of democratization makes it easier for the supporters of
Islamic politics to become more visible and influential in the political arena, and
increases their impact upon the political system.
Greater visibility
of Islam is an indisputable fact of Turkish social reality and there is little chance
of restricting it. I think the dread of fundamentalism, and an apocalyptic view of
the collapse of Turkish politics and society, stems from the fears of the radical
secularist elite. They seem to have somewhat unthinkingly assimilated a certain Western
ethnocentrism that is tinged with phobic attitudes toward Islam and its public manifestations.
One may deplore the
rising importance of Islamic votes in Turkish political life, but one also has to
take into consideration that these are legal and in-system votes that contribute
to the consolidation of the Turkish political system. One also has to consider -and
policy makers should pay particular attention to this- that the future of the progressively
deruralized Turkey will be shaped more and more in urban areas. We will inevitably
face a long quest for recognition of Islam in the political landscape of Turkey,
a country that has made the historic choice of remaining herself: both Muslim and
European.
Dr. Nur Vergin
Department of Public Administration,
Marmara University
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