Apart from Turkey, in European countries the death penalty has either been abolished entirely (Austria, Denmark, Federal Germany, Iceland, Luxemburg, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, Romania etc.) or reduced to situations limited to military crimes committed in wartime and to treason (Italy, Spain, Switzerland etc.). 39 States of the USA, and New Zealand and Australia have put an end to this punishment and in for Canada and Israil it has been maintained only for military crimes. The situation in Latin America is striking. Most of these are Third World countries, and they have either completely abolished death sentences (Venezuela, Colombia, the Dominic, Ecuador, Nicaragua, Honduras, Costa Rica, Panama, Uruguay etc.) or have restricted them to wartime (Argentina, Brazil, Mexico).

Amongst member countries of the Council of Europe, Turkey is the only country who has not signed Additional Protocol No. 6 concerning the abolition of the death penalty in peacetime. In the laws, this punishment is in force for as many as 40 crimes. The Constitution refers to the death penalty as well (Articles 15/2, 17/4 and 87).

However, certain developments, even if partially, can be considered as beginning to brighten this picture. First, the death penalty for 13 crimes has been changed to life imprisonment by an amendment made to the Turkish Penal Code (3679-21.11.1990). The second development is the provision that death sentences passed up to 8.4.1991 under the Anti-Terrorism Law dated 12.4.1991 not be carried out, and the annulment of the High Treason Law. The third and fundamentally interesting one is the unwilling behaviour of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey on the subject of carrying out finalised death sentences from 1984 to the present, and the fact that since that date no enforcement law has been adopted.

These developments, and in particular the last item, are signs that in our country, too, the death penalty has not found great support in the public conscience and at the state level. Now what is required by this may be carried out in the legal realm. The fact that the Constitution speaks of death penalties is not an obstacle to the removal of these from the laws. The stipulations of the Constitution do not make these penalties compulsory; they are there to ensure that they cannot be considered contrary to the Constitution. Technically, if the death penalty is not contrary to the Constitution, its removal cannot be unconstitutional either. Indeed, it fulfils the requirement of the "right to life" in Article 17/1.

Additional Protocol No. 6 should be accepted. Provisions in the laws relating to death penalties (at least the ones to be applied except in case of a state of war) should be taken out of effect.

By this phrase is meant excessively violent or arbitrary behaviour displayed by the security forces in the execution of their duties. The powers of the security forces to resort to violence, even to use their weapons, under certain circumstances and within certains limits are natural. The question here is whether or not erroneous aspects are to be found in the regulation of these powers. We wonder whether they have been regulated in such a way as to damage personal inviolability and whether there are provisions open to arbitrariness.

The subject has been dealt with in various laws and regulations (Mobile Forces Regulation, Article 25). The existence of differences in regulations from the standpoint of ordinary and emergency periods is also natural.

The general provision related to ordinary times is contained in Article 16 of the Law on the Duties and Powers of the Police. Promulgated in the single-party period (2559- 4.7.1934), this law recognises in a very generous way the power of the police to use weapons. In spite of this, it frequently emphasises that the use of weapons is a "last resort". The second law is the Law on Meetings and Demonstration Marches (2911-6.10.1983). Article 24 of this law allows under certain circumstances for a meeting or demonstration march to be dispersed and for force to be used in the process.

The main reason for people's being harmed, even losing their lives, as a result of excesses by the police and security forces is the provision added to the Law on the Duties and Powers of Police in 1985 with Law No. 3233.

Additional Article 6 - In cases of resistance by persons whose arrest is necessary or by groups whose dispersal is necessary or of their threatening to attack or carrying out attack, the police may use violence to subdue these actions.

Use of violence refers to the use of bodily force, physical force and all types of weapons specified in the law and it gradually increases according to the nature and level of resistance and attack in such a way as to bring about pacification.

In cases of intervention by group forces, the extent of the use of force and the equipment and instruments to be used are determined by the commander of the intervening force.

***

Revisions in the Criminal Procedure Law (3842, dated November 18, 1992) effected alterations in the earlier provisions, which had proved inadequate in preventing torture, and secured significant safeguards, such as: The clear recognition of the "right to remain silent" by the accused (Article 135/1, b, 4); the ascertainment of a statement or interrogation by a detailed record (Article 135/1, b, 7); an enumeration of prohibited methods of interrogation (Article 135/a); the explicit provision that statements obtained by such means may not be used as evidence (Article 135/a, final clause); the furnishing of legal assistance by the bar; examination by the attorney of records included in the preliminary investigation; the granting of an interview with the detained or accused party; permission to be accompanied by the attorney during the giving of a statement and questioning; waiver of the need for the power of attorney prior to defence; interviews in a setting ensuring that others are not privy to conversation; correspondence conducted without inspection (Articles 136/1, 138, 143, 136/final paragraph and 144); and evidence obtained in a manner contrary to law not to be used as a basis for judicial decisions (Article 254).

Despite such amendments and safeguards, the continuing practices of torture or claims to that effect is not surprising, because torture is not a disorder that can be eliminated simply by legislation. Moreover, even at the level of legislation, certain significant deficiencies may be observed. The following represent a few examples.

First of all, the Law no. 3842 which has introduced the favourable revisions above deny most of these rights to suspects and accused persons who come under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. Article 31 of the Law states that those provisions in force prior to the revisions in the Criminal Procedure Law will be implemented with respect to such suspects and accused persons. Only those revisions regarding the "prohibited methods of interrogation" (Article 135) and "exclusion from consideration as evidence" (Article 254) are in effect for those suspected and accused of offences under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. It should be recalled, however, that the original determination of which status is applicable for any suspect or accused is made by the police.

As we have seen, most of the former provisions that fail to provide protection for those suspected or accused of offences under the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts remain in force; whereas these are the very people who are most vulnerable to the threats facing suspects and the accused. This double standard in the law, therefore, is one of the main reasons for the continuation of torture practices or claims.

Second, the detention period is still lengthy, such that it practically facilitates or covers up ill-treatment. We will deal further with this issue shortly under the heading of detention.

Third, legislation, particularly that which is related to the trial of civil servants, clearly poses an obstacle to the trying of a civil servant accused of torture. This issue will be also dealt with in the part devoted to the State of Law.

Fourth, the penal and administrative sanctions are inadequate. The penalties for torture frequently come not under the provision pertaining to torture (Turkish Criminal Code, Article 243), but under provisions pertaining to less serious acts of "maltreatment" (Turkish Criminal Code, Article 245). One reason is the reference to "accused" in the article pertaining to torture, so that when the person under arrest who is not yet the "accused" becomes a victim of torture, only the article regarding "maltreatment" can be applied. It is obvious that the persons who have been arrested but not yet detained are the main targets of torture.

The citing of only these four points clearly demonstrates the existence of a need for fundamental changes in the legislation.

The duality that has been created by the revisions in the Criminal Procedure Law must be abolished and the safeguards provided therein should be rendered effective in all judicial venues and be applied to all offenses. Specifically, Paragraph 1, Article 31, of the Law no. 3842 must be abrogated.

In addition, the detention period must be reduced and an end be put to the privileges that hinder the prosecution of public officials; the provision for a penalty in cases of torture of suspects in the Turkish Criminal Code (Article 243) should also embrace those who are under detention; and, finally, the penalties provided in Articles 243 and 245 of the Turkish Criminal Code must be increased.

Personal inviolability also includes the protection and development of the individual's physical and moral being. (Constitution, Article 17/1). Against this, what meaning does the security investigation have, which is so widespread in Turkey?

Security enquiry is a pressure on and a threat to several individual rights and freedoms. The freedoms of thought, opinion, speech and work are damaged by this. Equality, presumption of innocence, privacy of private life and the principle of not seeking qualifications other than those required by the job on entering public service are all affected by security investigation and suffer depreciation. But above all else, the individual's dignity and physical-moral entity are impaired by this. From this viewpoint, it is necessary as a priority to relate the subject of security enquiry to the concept of personal inviolability.

It is useful to remind ourselves briefly of the principal features of the application of security enquiry. First, this application is striking from the viewpoint of the subjects it comprises. The subject of security enquiry is matters which do not constitute any offence. Criminal actions and behaviour already invite punitive sanction. Here, though, a kind of punishment of the individual for actions and behaviour which are not considered offences is in question.

The scope of security enquiry from the viewpoint of the individual is very wide. The application in Turkey is valid not only for duties with a degree of secrecy but for all fields of public service. The Security Enquiry By-law No. 245 dated 8.3.1990 (Official Gazette, 13.4.1990 - 20491) which is in force today decrees the resort to "archive search" in all appointments and transfers of public sector personnel. This expression is used in place of the expression "having a criminal record" which had been in use up to that time. In fact, the alteration mainly consists of this. It has not been possible to secure a serious reduction in the scope of personnel subject to security enquiry.

Another striking point from the legal point of view is that security enquiry has no constitutional or legal basis. Up to now the subject has been regulated by decisions of the council of ministers, circulars and by-laws. In fact, in the Security Enquiry Regulation currently in force referred to above, the space reserved for legal basis has been left blank because there is no such law. Therefore, such an application violates the principle of imposing restrictions on rights and freedoms solely by law. (Constitution, Article 13/1). Thus as many as 10 constitutional rights and freedoms or principles listed above are restricted by acts of the executive which have no legal basis. This is a complete violation of the Constitution.

In this situation, what should be done? It is obvious that certain sections of public service within a state need special care. It may be accepted that there is a need for security enquiry in employing personnel for civil service. But it is necessary to keep this application within reasonable bounds. And this is the subject of a legal regulation. In the light of this, security enquiry should be reorganised by a regulation within a limited framework. Finally, there is the necessity of carrying out a diminishing of the powers that are granted by some provisions to the administration to take decisions to the detriment of an individual based on secret enquiry.

In regulating the security enquiry by law, it should be listed and indicated as an exception in employing personnel in the public services. It would not be too difficult to determine these exceptions. Certainly the provision by law of such an application in areas such as the military, security and intelligence services is appropriate. For personnel to be employed in prisons and institutions executing punishment, the same enquiry may be considered proper. Except for these exceptional items, security enquiry on entry to the remaining services should be ended. Already in Grand National Assembly commissions the above categories have been specified in draft laws and the limitation of security enquiry to these has been suggested.

We have stated that certain laws equip the administration with the power to make decisions to the detriment of individuals with the methods of secret enquiry. The most definite and most disquieting examples of this are contained in the Passport Law and the Martial Law Statute. Article 22 of the Passport Law states that permission to travel abroad may not be given to "those whose departure from the country has been determined by the Interior Ministry" to be a danger to public security.

The last paragraph of the amended second article of the Martial Law Statute No. 1402 (2766 - 28.12.1982, Official Gazette 30.12.1982 - 17914) reads as follows: "Requests by martial law commanders for appointment, according to their status, or dismissal of public personnel whose employment is deemed doubtful from the viewpoint of general security, general peace, and public order in the region or whose services are not beneficial, and for the removal from duty or dismissal of those working in local administration shall be carried out immediately by the relevant agencies and organs. In relation to these, the provisions of Retirement Fund Law No. 5434 or of law on other social security institutions shall be applied. In this way, civil servants, other public officials, and public service workers who are so dismissed will no more be employed in public services. Concerning requests related to those who fall within the scope of Article 21 of this law, provisions in their own special laws shall be applied."

It is seen that both these provisions violate the individual person's right to protect and develop his/her material and moral being. These provisions have found a wide area of application. As will be recalled, certain artists and lawyers could not obtain Security permission in cases where they needed to travel abroad for medical treatment, and moreover a large number of citizens have been deprived of their right to travel abroad. As for Amended Article 2 of Law No. 1402, this has provided the opportunity for approximately 5 thousand public personnel, among them university teaching staff, to be removed from their duties without any cause being shown and with legal redress being prohibited.

Security enquiry should be regulated by law and should be defined as being applicable only to personnel who will be employed in units which are rated as confidental, the Turkish Armed Forces, the General Directorate of Security, intelligence organisations, and in institutions executing sentences, and prisons.

The provisions of Article 22 of the Passport Law and the final clause of Amended Article 2 of the Martial Law Statute should be put out of effect.

Of the two important restrictions relating to personal liberty and security, the first is the situation of arrest and detention, the second detention on remand.

The principle questions of the detention regime are: conditions of arrest, notification of the arrested person's relatives, the rights of the person arrested, and periods of detention.

The conditions for arrest and detention are regulated by Article 127 of Criminal Procedure Law (CPL). These conditions are reasonable; they are also in conformity with the standards laid down in the European Convention on Human Rights. (Article 5/1, c).

With the amendments made to the CPL in 1992 (Law No. 3842), the role of the judge in arrest and detention is also recognised. According to this, the arrested person's lawyer, legal representative, next of kin of the first or second degree or spouse may apply to a justice of the peace to procure immediate release. (Amended Article 128). However, pursuant to Article 31 of the amendment law, this provision is not applied to offences falling within the Jurisdiction of State Security Courts. Here once again doubts about discriminatory legislation arise.

Proposal:

Article 31 of Law No. 3842 should be amended so as to remove the exception relating to State Security Courts.

* * *

It has been stated that the second problem of the detention regime relates to the "notification of relatives". This duty has on many occasions not been carried out. This situation arises from deficiencies in the type of training given to security personnel and from lack of supervision. However, the legal arrangements are not flawless either. First and foremost, the Constitution has provided an exceptional provision leaving the door open to arbitrary behaviour. According to this, "Notification of the situation of the person arrested or detained shall be made promptly to the next of kin except in cases of definite necessities pertaining to the risk of revealing the scope and subject of the investigation compelling otherwise". (Article 19/6). The 1961 Constitution did not contain such an exceptional provision. It is also impossible to understand from the exception provision in the 1982 Constitution whether what may not be notified is the event of arrest or the reasons for it. Law on the Duties and Powers of Police does not provide greater certainty: The next of kin of the person arrested need not be notified of the situation "if this shall pose a definite risk of revealing the subject of investigation" (Article 13).

Both in the Constitution and in the Law on the Duties and Powers of Police, these exceptional restrictions are extremely harmful. The role of these evasions is great in jeopardising the suspected or accused person's rights and in dismaying his relatives. These provisions require to be deleted from the Constitution and the law.

The phrase "except in cases of definite necessities pertaining to the risk of revealing the scope and subject of the investigation" contained in the 6th Paragraph of Article 19 of the Constitution should be deleted, and the provision of the paragraph should be rearranged as follows, as in the 1961 Constitution: "The situation of the person arrested or detained shall promptly be notified to his/her next of kin".

Likewise, the expression "if this shall pose a definite risk of revealing the subject of investigation" in Article 13 of the Law on the Duties and Powers of Police should be deleted from the text, and the paragraph should read as follows: "The arrest of a person shall promptly be notified to his/her next of kin".

* * *

From the viewpoint of an arrested person's rights, the 1992 CPL (CMUK) amendments have provided important guarantees: the right of silence, the possibility of being able to present evidence in his favour in a more reliable manner, the ensuring of a written record of a statement or interrogation, prohibited interrogation methods and the non acceptance as evidence of statements obtained in this way (Articles 135, 135/a, 254/2), and having the legal assistance of a lawyer and being able to see and contact him/her at all times. (Articles 136, final clause and 144). However, these guarantees, apart from "prohibited interrogation methods" and "non-acceptance as evidence" are not applied in offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts. At the stage of arrest, those who determine what is within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts and what is outside it are the police officers.

Discriminatory provisions concerning offences falling within the jurisdiction of State Security Courts need to be removed.

A critical point relating to detention regime is the subject of periods. After the 1992 CPL (CMUK) amendments, the first period has been kept as 24 hours, and it has been laid down that in collective offences committed by three or more persons, the prosecutor may extend this to 4 days by written order; and if the investigation still cannot be completed, it may be prolonged to 8 days by the decision of a justice of the peace upon the prosecutor's request. Thus, in collective offences, the maximum 15-day period effective up to that date has been reduced to 8 days. (Article 128). However, as expected, this, too, has exceptions. These periods are 48 hours and 15 days in offences falling within the jurisdiction of State Security Courts and twice this, i.e. 96 hours and 30 days, in offences falling within the jurisdiction of State Security Courts in state of emergency regions (Law No. 3842, Article 30).

These periods are very long and greatly exceed European standards. In the system of the European Convention on Human Rights, the maximum period of 96 hours, in other words 4 days, may be extended a little by judicial decision. The lengthy detention periods in Turkey has also been observed by the European Human Rights Commission, and circumstances that necessitate payment of compensation by Turkey have emerged.

A draft amendment of law signed by Necmettin Erbakan, the Prime Minister, and prepared by the Ministry of Justice, that also takes account of this has been presented to the Presidency of the Grand National Assembly. In the draft, in case of simple offences, the maximum period of detention in collective offences is reduced from 8 days to 7 subject to judicial decision; fundamentally important, the same principle is adopted for offences that are under the jurisdiction of State Security Courts. In state of emergency regions there is the possibility of extending the 7-day period by a further 3 days, in other words to 10 days, by judicial decision. Moreover, the draft amendment further narrows down the jurisdiction of State Security Courts.

The periods laid down in the draft law are reasonable, and these need to be put into effect.

* * *

While concluding the subject of detention, it must be mentioned that in certain areas closely related to the subject there is also a need for additional regulations.

Proposal:

(a) From the moment of arrest all information should be collected in one centre and the person arrested and his/her condition should be continually monitored (The killing of Metin Göktepe has once more made clear how necessary such a measure is).

(b) Interrogation must be carried out by the prosecutor and a lawyer must be present. This item also reduces the probability of rejection of a statement.

(c) The Draft Judicial Police Force Statute should be passed into law and a judicial police force be founded. Without this, the realisation of a trustworthy detention regime is almost impossible.

(d) The technical facilities offered to government doctors and the Judicial Medical Institution must be improved and, more importantly, these must acquire an active and protected legal status.

Judges in Turkey have tended towards simply passing judgements for detention in certain types of cases. So much so that detention on remand seems like a rule. Because trials have also dragged on for a long time, detention, which is basically a preventive measure, has been transformed into a punishment suffered in advance. Some aspects of the criminal procedure law which simplify and fail to restrict detention have also played a role in this.

The 1992 CPL (CMUK) amendments have brought about important innovations in this field, too. Detention conditions and circumstances have been narrowed and clarified, and the principle of proportionality has been adopted which did not exist before. (Article 104, last paragraph). Moreover, some sort of "detention trial" has been introduced in which both prosecution and defence take part.

Doubtful and deficient arrangements also exist. In offences including punishments restricting personal liberties for up to 6 months, recognising the crime's having awakened "indignation" in the community as one of the reasons for detention (Article 104/3) is one of these. With this provision, it is as though the accused has been left not to the judiciary but to the community and its conscience. Another negative factor is that the new detention regime is not applied to offences falling within the jurisdiction of the State Security Courts.

The length or brevity of the period passed in custody is also important from the viewpoint of the accused's rights and the right to fair trial. There are no universal and definite rules on the length of reasonable detention periods. However, by examining every individual case within its own context, the European Court of Human Rights has produced certain yardsticks.

The Court has established in two decisions that periods in custody of 26 and 24 months are not to be considered "reasonable" and violate the provision of Article 5/3 of the European Convention on Human Rights (Neumeister and Stögmüller). In recent years, influenced by these decisions, several European countries have limited periods in custody still further. For example, in Federal Germany these periods are 6 months for simple offences and 1 year for terrorist crimes.

The 1992 CPL (CMUK) amendments established the detention periods by excluding the State Security Courts once more. In the preliminary investigation the upper limit is 6 months. In the initiation of a public prosecution, it is 2 years. However, in sentences of 7 years or over the judge has the right to exercise discretion (Article 110). As is seen, the question in this field is not the length or the brevity of the periods, but that once again the State Security Courts have been left out.

If the custody is unjust and the trial ends up in acquittal, then what happens? For those who know the taste of freedom, it is hard to determine the price to compensate for the loss. However, in these situations there is a law whose application is possible: the Law Concerning Payment of Compensation to Illegally Arrested or Detained Persons (466 - 7.5.1964, Official Gazette 15.5.1964-11704). But the compensation payable under this law is ridiculous and, leaving aside compensating for the damage, injures human dignity. It is necessary to reconsider this subject.

On the subject of the custody regime, exceptions concerning the State Security Courts should be lifted, or more reasonable limits should be placed on these. The provision, "the awakening of public indignation by the offence or..." in Article 104 of the CMUK should be deleted.

The legal regulation relating to compensation for unlawful arrest should be reviewed and compensation payments brought to a state of compatibility with human dignity.

Another variable which closely concerns the functioning or non-functioning of democracy is the state of intellectual freedoms. To this group, freedom of religion must be added. Freedom of belief and religion ultimately have an "intellectual" nature, they belong to a person's spiritual world.

Under this heading, after freedom of religion, freedom of thought and "offences of thought", freedom of science and art, and freedom of mass communication will be considered.

At the forefront of freedoms of religion comes freedom of belief. This is followed by the freedoms of worship and education.

Freedom of belief includes and protects being able to believe in any religion and also to have no religious-theist belief. The first and third paragraphs of Article 24 of the Constitution read as follows: "Everyone has the right to freedom of conscience, religious belief and conviction(...). No one shall be compelled to worship, or to participate in religious ceremonies and rites, to reveal religious beliefs and convictions, or be blamed or accused because of his/her religious beliefs and convictions".

In a decision, the Constitutional Court also stated as follows: "In a secular State everybody is free to choose his/her religion and to be able to divulge it within the limits of freedom of religion and conscience. The same is true for those who hold no religious belief" (E.1986/11)

At first glance, there seem to be no legal problems in our country from the viewpoint of the freedom of belief. At least, this is the situation for the majority religion and creeds. It may also be said that certain interventions against minority beliefs or non-believers have not arisen from the law but from the unlawful actions of certain administrators, or that they derive from communal pressures.

The judicial authorities have been careful on the subject of beliefs and have taken protective decisions. The decision of the Constitutional Court considering such provisions of the Turkish Criminal Code that discriminate between celestial and non-celestial religions and that punish attacks only on the first group as being contrary to freedom of belief and annulling them, is an example of this (E.1986/11). This deficiency has been overcome by an amendment of law made later, and in this sense all religions and beliefs have been put under protection (3369-20.5.1987, Official Gazette 26.5.1987 - 19471). The Court of Cassation also behaved in the same way with its decision considering the freedoms of belief and worship of Jehovah's Witnesses as being under the protection of the Constitution (9. Penal Chamber E.1985/2623).

However, it is necessary to deepen these preliminary observations. There are at least two significant examples of unjust interventions in freedom of belief by law and legislation. The first, compulsory religious education, will be returned to a little later under the heading "religious education". The second example is the provision in the 1st paragraph of Article 43 of the Civil Status Law No. 1587 dated 5.5.1972 that a person's "religion" be indicated in his birth registration. Here obvious contravention of the provision of the Constitution that "no one (...) shall be compelled to reveal his/her religious beliefs and convictions" is in question. However, in two judgements the Constitutional Court reached the conclusion that this provision was not contrary to the Constitution (E.1979/9 and E.1995/17). Henceforth, this provision may only be rendered ineffective by means of legislative enactment.

Regarding freedom of worship, the framework laid out by the Constitution is that religious worship, rituals and ceremonies are free so long as they do not violate Article 14 of the Constitution (Article 24/2). Similar provisions exist in all legal systems. The context for religious practice in Turkey has been made flexible and, in a sense, "liberalized." An end has been put to the use of certain houses of worship for other purposes (2845-November 15, 1935); pilgrimage has been facilitated; the original language (i.e. Arabic) of the Muslim call to prayer has been restored; tombs (türbe) have been reopened to visitors; religious orders have been considered to enjoy constitutional protection by the Court of Cassation on the condition that they do not go beyond the dimension of belief (9. Penal Chamber, 1985/2623), and have been let to return to social and even political life. Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Code and the Law no. 6187 on the Protection of the Freedom of Conscience and Freedom of Meeting, which had served as the pretext for raids on "Secret Rituals", were abrogated (April 12, 1991). Permission for attendance at Muslim Friday prayers on condition that it creates no interference with public service has led to a de facto situation of limited freedom.

Issues arising in association with the freedom of worship involve violations by certain administrators of the principle that worship shall not be subject to compulsion. These kinds of incidents do not originate from the law, however, and on the contrary, constitute a violation of the law. For this reason, this study the main subject of which is the "scanning of existing legislation" should not be expected to address these issues.

In the field of religious education, one can speak of both a liberalization, on one hand, and practices that infringe on laicism and the freedom of belief, on the other.

The liberalization in question is a fact that is observed at the level of civil society. Indications such as the existence of classes for Quran instruction-regardless of whether permission has been granted or whether it takes place under official supervision-activities by religious foundations and associations; and the rapid proliferation of religious publications, films and videos and television broadcasts, are evidence of this fact. Complaints that religious training and publishing activities are a monopoly of the State no longer have any foundation.

The problem lies elsewhere. It is at the State level and concerns laicism. The "laic" State which ought to remain neutral regarding Islam and other religions has itself come to occupy the position of being a religious propagator. Here, we are not concerned with the degree of authenticity of the particular version of Islam that is being disseminated.

The State possesses three main channels for religious propagation and instruction: The Department of Religious Affairs; Highschools for the Training of Religious Functionaries; and compulsory religious classes in primary and secondary education. The last two are the first to come to mind when one addresses the subject of religious training.

The constant increase in numbers of Highschools for the Training of Religious Functionaries has been criticized chiefly from the point of view of laicism and the degeneration of the unity of laic education (the Law for the Unification of Education). These criticisms are entirely justified. Secondary education today has indeed a dual character, with some pupils educated in one way and the others in a different way.

Another dimension of the issue, however, is one which pertains to democracy. The foundations on which democratic systems have arisen consist not merely of the freedom of enterprise alone but also the premise of "liberation of the intellect" and "free man". The phrase "The Age of Enlightenment" is one expression of this. The democratization of a society and political system is possible only to the extent that man and his thought are free, which in turn depends on the development of his capabilities to conceive rationally of, and change, nature, the universe and society. That is why it is requisite that individuals and, in this connection, young people be raised in a "culture of questioning".

In the religious conception of the world, however, a principle of obedience and submission take the place of values like freedom, intellect, debate and questioning. As the number of people increases who do not consider themselves "authorized to make a decision" concerning almost any aspect of life, such as law, politics, economy, morals and even daily life and who believe that the rules of behaviour in these areas have "already been decreed", our chances diminish for a democratic regime based on freedom and human rights.

Problems related to the human rights dimension of democratization in Turkey are first and foremost related to the "Human". As for the solution to these, to a large extent it depends on how youth is brought up. From this point of view, secondary education is a crucial sector. Those who have had the opportunity to get to know young people in higher education closely have observed at first hand how an increasingly large section of the nation's youth is trapped and spinning in the whirlpools of a dogmatic and totalitarian world view.

In order to raise generations attached to human freedom and rights and democracy, it is necessary to make fundemental changes in secondary education.

***

"Compulsory religious education" in primary and secondary education is a serious problem in this connection. It would be useful to know how this point was reached.

In pluralistic-liberal democracies, the phrase "freedom of thought" signifies the freedom of expression (and this is its essence). This freedom occupies a privileged position. The doors are open to the expression of thought and its defence and closed to "Crimes of Thought".

The bitter experience of the period prior to and during the Second World War led to a reconsideration of certain aspects of freedom of thought. In some countries, propaganda in support of fascism, discrimination, anti-semitism and incitement to war came under prohibition. Legislation to combat terrorism also forbids praise of terrorist organisations.

But, "crimes of thought" in Turkey have existed in a real sense and on even broader grounds. The Anti-Terrorism Act has carried out a sweeping clean-up in this sphere. A significant proportion of the provisions regarding certain "crimes of thought", which were pronounced to be in conformity with the Constitution by the Constitutional Court and which were implemented at times in a very rigid manner by the Court of Cassation and the Military Court of Cassation, has been preempted by the political will.

The Anti-Terrorism Act has abrogated Articles 140, 141, 142 (excluding Paragraph 3) and Article 163 on "crimes of thought" in the Turkish Criminal Code (Article 23). In this context, propaganda and praise no longer constitute offences. In reference to these articles, the statement of reasons of the Anti-Terrorism Act states that they were being abrogated because their implementation had resulted in restrictions in the freedom of expression of thought and the freedom to organize on the basis of ideas; and in their place, an arrangement was being made that would safeguard the freedom of the expression of thought, so long as it did not advocate violence, and the freedom of association in support of ideas. Undoubtedly, the intent of the law-makers in this case was to allow the expression of ideas that do not advocate violence and to permit association on the basis of ideas. Article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, which will be dealt with shortly, represents a serious and unacceptable exception to this.

Another important phase of reform has occurred in the area of "language freedom". The repeal of the Law on Publication in Languages Other than Turkish (by Article 23 of the Anti-Terrorism Act) means that freedom of press and publication (books, magazines, videos, tapes, etc.) in every language (or, more to the point, in Kurdish which was the actually targeted language) has been restored. But the provisions in the Constitution that impose restrictions on "languages prohibited by law" still remain in force (Article 26/3 and 28/2).

The Anti-Terrorism Act has also abrogated Article 163 of the Turkish Criminal Code and, parallel to this, a special law, no. 6187, the Law for the Protection of the Freedom of Conscience and Freedom of Meeting. The provisions abrogated were principally aimed at penalizing these three offences: Anti-laic propaganda, anti-laic organization and the exploitation and abuse of religious sentiments or of things regarded as sacred by religion for the purpose of securing personal or political gains. The first two offences pertained to the expression of thought and to organization on the basis of ideas. Their abrogation should be regarded as a positive step towards liberal democracy. Besides, these two offences had no basis in the constitutions of 1961 and 1982. The third offence which might be shortly called "abuse" has no place in the context of the freedom of thought; besides, it is provided for in the 1982 Constitution. The final paragraph of Article 24 reads as follows: "No one shall be allowed to exploit or abuse religion or religious feelings, or things held sacred by religion, in any manner whatsoever, for the purpose of securing personal or political gain or influence..." What constitutes the expression of thought or the "exploitation and abuse" remains the task of the courts. What interests us here is that no penal sanction exists in the legislation against actions that "exploit and abuse". Current events clearly show the drawbacks of this lacuna.

The Anti-Terrorism Act contains provisions that restrict the freedom of expression of thought. The first of these pertains to the punishment of those who print and publish announcements and statements of terrorist organizations (Article 6/2). However, this situation concerns freedom of press and publication more closely and will therefore be treated under the appropriate heading shortly. The second curtailment is the prohibition of and penalties for propaganda relating to terrorist organisations (Article 7/2). Similar provisions exist in other countries possessing legislation to fight terrorism and cannot be said to violate the freedom of thought.

These are not the typical "crimes of thought" spelled out in the Anti-Terrorism Act; rather, they reside in Article 8 entitled "Propaganda against the Indivisibility of the State". The original text of the article was as follows: "Regardless of method or objective or idea, no written or verbal propaganda and meetings, demonstrations and marches may be held that aim at impairing the indivisibility of the Republic of Turkey. Those who do so shall be subject to heavy imprisonment of 2 to 5 years and a heavy fine of 50 to 100 million Turkish Liras." The second paragraph of the article applies to members of the press.

As we have seen, the arrangement that takes as its starting point "regardless of whichever method, objective or idea" results in the punishment of even such statements having nothing to do with terrorism. By this provision, the offences of the earlier Article 142/3 of the Turkish Criminal Code have become even more undefined and a reduction has been made only in the penalty. This provision, which imposes penalties even on thoughts that do not involve advocating violence, is a typical "crime of thought" and violates the freedom of thought.

As a matter of fact, the practice has vindicated these worries. Application of this article has led to the interrogation of a number of writers and publishers, and some of them have received final sentences. In situations where the provisions of this article cannot be implemented, Article 312 of the Turkish Criminal Code is implemented and decisions for final verdicts are obtained. In applications of Article 8 of the Turkish Criminal Code, the Court of Cassation has not sought the condition of a special intention of committing an offence, and a general intention has been considered sufficient for finding a suspect guilty (9. Penal Chamber, 1993/190).

The latest amendment of the Anti-Terrorism Act has eliminated from the text the phrase "regardless of method, purpose and thought" (Law 4126, October 27, 1995). This deletion represents a positive action from the perspective of preventing punishment of a suspect without the necessity of seeking fault in the action; however, it is still unclear as to which kind of verbal and written propaganda is of the nature to impair "the indivisibility of the State with its territory and nation." There is still the possibility that expressions of thought and comment may be subject to punishment. The revised form of the Article also puts at risk the principle that "offences must be laid down in the law" and the right to be informed. (Çetin Özek, In:The Problem of Democratization in Turkey, in Turkish, edited by Istanbul University, Faculty of Law, 1996, p.35, footnote 32).

As will be noted, the article in its revised form also fails to seek the condition that propaganda be of such a character as to impair the indivisibility of the state with its territory and nation. To be subject to punishment for the act of propaganda, it is unnecessary to consider whether or not the propaganda would lead to this outcome. To punish the perpetrator, it is sufficient that he has acted, or is assumed to have acted, with that purpose in mind. It is clearly evident that the aim, rather than the act, is punished, and that it is contrary to the philosophy of democracy. For this reason, the only thing that must be done is to abrogate Article 8 of the Turkish Criminal Code (see Sahir Erman, In: The Problem of Democratization in Turkey, p. 50).

There are other provisions in force in the Turkish Criminal Code, in addition to the Anti-Terrorism Act, that restrict freedom of thought or that are interpreted and implemented as such. Such provisions punish those who obtain information, publication or dissemination of which is prohibited by the competent authorities (Article 132/3); those who gain access to information related to State secrets (Article 136/4); those who disseminate news that has been prohibited (Article 137); and those who publish articles which serve to cause the public to disobey the law and which endanger the security of the country or those who discourage the public from military duty by publication or persuasion (Article 155). In recent years, it has been observed that the application of the provisions of Article 155 is being sought in the prosecution of anti-war ideas.

Article 158 of the Turkish Criminal Code imposes penalties for "insults and cursing" directed at the person of the President of the Republic. The broad interpretation by courts of insults and cursing has led to the designation of strong criticism as an offence. Article 159 of the Turkish Criminal Code describes the offense of "openly insulting and deriding the Turkish nation, the Republic, the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, the Government, the Ministers, the armed and security forces of the State or the moral personality of the Judiciary". Numerous writers have been tried on grounds of this article.

The Constitutions of 1961 and 1982 acknowledged freedom of science and arts in addition to freedom of thought. Although these two freedoms are intertwined, they differ in terms of their legal status.

The special place of science and arts throughout the history of human kind made it imperative that a free environment be provided for the creative work in these fields. For example, although some acts of propaganda (such as fascism, racism, discrimination, war propaganda, etc.), indecency and instigation to crime are not under the protection of law, it is inconceivable to have committed such offences with scientific and artistic creation. In this sense, freedom of science and arts is absolute, and is subject only to its own rules and criticism.

In Turkey, the courts valued these two freedoms differently. Under the 1961 Constitution, the Constitutional Court accepted the restricted nature of the freedom of thought, and ruled that 'offences of thought' were allowed in the Constitution. The same court, however, held the opinion that freedom of science and arts was to be unrestricted. Yet the distinction between restricted freedom of thought and unrestricted freedom of science and arts has not helped the latter.

Many authors, translators and publishers of local and foreign works were prosecuted under article 142 of the Turkish Criminal Code, and some of them received sentences. The annulment of this article in 1991 seemed to bring a relaxation, but it was soon understood that it was replaced by article 8 of the Anti-Terrorism Act under which many studies and research have been considered to be "propaganda against the indivisibility of the State".

In the meantime, the 1961 Constitution which recognised the absolute freedom of science and arts was replaced with this provision of the Constitution of 1982: "The right to disseminate scientific and artistic works cannot be exercised for the purpose of changing articles 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution" (art. 27/2). In no other democracy there exists a Constitution which restricts science and works of art with provisions that relate to the form of the State (art.1), the characteristics of the Republic (art. 2), and the integrity of the State, its official language, flag, national anthem and capital (art. 3).

The specific problem for scientific work is the 'crimes of thought'. The main problem for works of art on the other hand, is with the Administration. Artistic works such as films, musical pieces, videos, and plays are frequently faced with such acts of the administration as censorship, control, banning, and even outright destruction (of films).

The censorship of films is comprised of very strict controls carried out in at least three stages starting with the examination of the script, and continue throughout the shooting process and take their final form at the completion of shooting. The relatively tolerant attitute of the Council of State has not been very helpful in eliminating such strict controls.

The Governors of the provinces are also authorised to ban the showing of films. One film which succeeded in passing all stages of the censor was banned in the city of Gaziantep by the Office of the Governor on grounds that it "included scenes that were aimed at imposing ideas with the intention of defaming the Turkish police and destroying the integrity of the State". It is quite difficult to comprehend why the same film did not exactly pose the same 'threat' in other provinces of the country. The above mentioned Governorship banned the showing of 38 films in a period of 9 months.

There are also cases where the Governors ban films in order to protect moral values. But this raises the question that if a film (e.g. Betty Blue) can be shown in, for example, Istanbul then why is it considered to have adverse effects on the moral values in Kocaeli, a neighbouring province with a similar a social and cultural structure?

Musical performances, concerts and other audio-visual performances have also been subjected to strict controls. Concerts and video and music cassette tapes can be banned. In such administrative measures it is again the governorships that play the major role, but the influence of the ministry at the background is discernable. In other words, a political structure obstructs scientific and artistic production.

The situation with theatre plays is not different. Plays face police inquiry, administrative injunction, or censorship from within the institution. Administrative decisions are usually based on the Law on the Duties and Powers of the Police, Add. Art. 1 (1985) and on article 11 of the Law of Provincial Administration.

All the pressures exerted on artistic work and the arbitrariness of implementation are due, to a large extent, to legislation. First and foremost comes the Constitution which justifies these pressures, and especially the censorship on films (Preamble; art. 13, 26 and 27). Law on Duties and Powers of the Police (art. 6) and a Regulation dated 1983 have also been the grounds on which such censorship is based. These two sources were repealed with the promulgation in 1986 of the Law for the Works of Cinema, Video and Music (SVMEK). The present pratice of censorship is based on SVMEK and on the regulations enacted on the basis of that law.

SVMEK has described its objective as: "to bring order and standard to the cinema and music life for our national unity, integrity and continuity" (art. 1). It is obvious that this represents an approach which restricts the universality and creativity of art. The law, on the other hand, brings two more control criteria in addition to the 9 already inscribed in the Constitution (art. 13/1), and thus even exceeds the Constitution in this respect. As if this were not enough, the by-law enacted on the basis of this Law has introduced two more criteria, bringing the number of clauses aimed at restricting the performance or practicing of art to 13. These last two criteria are the "hurting of national sentiments" and the "policies [of the State]" and especially its "foreign policies" (arts. 1 and 9).

The constraints in this area are not limited to preventive or preliminary control mechanisms. The Administration reserves the right to interfere and ban, at any time, any work of art that has already passed the censors. Article 9 of the Law for the Works of Cinema, Video and Music authorizes the Administration to make arbitrary interventions:

"Administrative officials may outlaw the distribution and performance of works of art which have the potential of causing a social incident because of the characteristics of the region within the scope of their authority and duty by indicating the reasons thereof. As a result of any inquiry that is held by the Ministry or administrative officials, if the work of art in question is found to be contrary to the indivisible entity of the State with its territory and nation, national sovereignty, the Republic, national security, public order, general security, public good, general ethics, health, and customs and traditions, then such work shall be banned and judicial prosecution shall be carried out."

The above provision of the law, with such ambiguous terms as "the potential of causing a social incident" and "as a result of any inquiry", is the main source of the arbitrariness witnessed in practice. Although it is nominally possible to appeal against such administrative orders, the requirement to appeal separately in every province in which the work has been banned, and the economic and physical difficulties that this gives rise to, renders this right ineffectual. In essence, behind many of the prohibitions is the Ministry itself and its instructions, but when it comes to judicial action process, the Ministry absolves itself from any responsibility, and the owner of the banned work is compelled to file lawsuits against a number of administrative units in different administrative districts.

The banning of plays, on the other hand, is based on the following provision of Add. Article 1/2 of the Law on Duties and Powers of Police.

"Those that are found to be against the public morals, to the indivisible integrity of the State with its territory and nation or to the constitutional order shall be banned by the police under the instructions of the highest administrative official of the locality, and the relevant persons shall be referred to the judicial authorities."

(a) Provision of Article 27/2 of the Constitution which restricts the freedom to promote science and arts and which has no other example in the world must be abrogated.

(b) Another provision in the same article which reads, "Provisions of this Article shall not preclude regulation by law of entry and distribution of foreign publications into the country" (paragraph 3) was incorporated in the said Article as a constitutional basis for the provision of Article 31 of the Law on Press. These provisions are in contradiction with the principle of free flow of news and information without any boundaries. Furthermore, the phenomon of globalization has been recognised worldwide. Treating sources of information and news in a manner similar to drugs and arms is wrong. This article must be abrogated.

(c) Paragraph (D) of Article 8 of the Law on Duties and Powers of Police (3233 - 1985) (PVSK) which provides that "If the police has conclusive evidence and upon an order to be issued by the highest civil authority of the locality: (...) D) Places wherein games or plays or films or video bands which could be detrimental to the undivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation, constitutional order, general security and public moral are played, performed or shown .... shall be closed down and/or prohibited by the police from carrying on business " should be deleted from the text.

(d) As for Paragraph A) and C) of Article 11 of (PVSK) which read:

"Police shall prohibit, ban and prevent from further performance persons who:

A) behave in a manner or display an attitude which is shameful, not acceptable in terms of public order and in contradiction with principles of public morals and who expresses an opinion, sings a song, performs music or shows of similar nature;

B) (....)

C) produce or sell films, records, video and sound recordings which are not congruent with public morals even if no complaint has been lodged in connection therewith",

Paragraph A) should be entirely abrogated while the following phrase in paragraph C) should be deleted from the text: "..... produce or sell films, records, video and sound recordings which are not congruent with public morals....".

(d) The following provision of paragraph 2 of additional Article of PVSK (3233-1985) must be abrogated: "Those which are determined to be in contradiction with public morals, undivisible unity of the State with its territory and nation or the constitutional order shall be prohibited by the police upon an order of the highest local civil authority, and those concerned shall be promptly referred to judicial authorities".

The power and duty of the police to refer the suspects of a crime to the judicial authorities already exists in the legislation. Consequently, the annulment of this provision in its entirety will not cause any problems with respect to this last point either.

e) The expression in article 1 of the Law for the Works of Cinema, Video and Music (SVMEK), setting out the objective: "to bring order and standard to the cinema and music life for our national unity, integrity and continuity" should be replaced with a democratic and liberal arrangement.

f) Article 9 of the SVMEK given above should be abrogated.

g) The expressions, included in the by-laws issued after the SVMEK, such as "the policies [of the State]", "foreign policy" and "hurting of national sentiments" should be put out of effect.

The relatively new concept of the freedoms of mass media has both a conventional and a relatively new aspect. The conventional aspect is the freedom of press and publication, whereas the relatively new aspect concerns the audio-visual communications (radio, television, video, etc.). The following sub-headings correspond to this distinction.

This freedom is composed of components such as the freedom to receive and impart news, and the freedom of expression through press and publication. What are the main problems in this area in Turkey?

The most striking is the high number of prosecutions. This is followed by the high number of preventive measures. Special attention should also be paid to seizure, destruction and closure. And finally, the role of legislation should not be forgotten. The main problem lies therein.

Prosecutions have come in different and consecutive waves, but they have acquired a certain permanency. Some figures will give a sufficient idea.

In the period between 1980 and 1984, a total of 181 prosecutions were held for the owners, editors, writers, correspondents, translators and authors of several newspapers, journals and books, resulting in a total imprisonment sentence issued by the court of first instance for 82 persons of 316 years 4 months and 20 days.

After the restoration of normal political life following the elections in 1983, the situation got worse rather than better. During the first five and a half years of the civil regime, a total of 458 publications were seized, for 368 publications the courts decided seizure and destruction, 39 tons of newspapers, journals and books were burnt, a total of 2127 persons were tried in 1426 lawsuits, total prison sentences given reached 2000 years in addition to billions of TL of fines, and the distribution of some newspapers and journals were obstructed.

Following a legislative change in 1986 (3266-6.3.1986, Official Gazette 12.3.1986-19045) a new trend started: the suits about 'harmful publications'. The penalty fines ruled in these suits reached astronomical and impossible levels. Some theatre plays, films, literature and scientific works were categorised as "obscene" and took their fair share from the inquiries. In such suits the judge does not have the freedom to appoint an expert. According to Law no. 3266, a commission has been set up within the prime ministry, the majority members of which are selected by the high ranking State bureaucrats, and it has been entrusted with "the duty of acting as official experts to the judicial authorities" in cases involving articles 426, 427, and 428 of the Turkish Criminal Code.

Following the lifting of martial law, such cases were decided and sentences were given in the civil courts. Although the Anti-Terrorism Act (TMK) has abrogated some "crimes of thought" (12.4.1991), the number of lawsuits after this date increased rather than declined. The reason for this is the new offences brought about by the Anti-Terrorism Act, especially with article 8 thereof. For example in 1992, journalists and writers were given a total of 25 years and 11 months of prison sentences and a total fine of TL 5,976 million. In 1993, however, the amount of total prison sentences rose to 165 years, with fines reaching TL 38,267 million, as a result of which 18 persons were imprisoned.

The account for the year 1996 shows a total term of imprisonment for 140 years with billions more of fines. According to the October 1996 figures of the Human Rights Association, the total number of arrested and sentenced journalists and writers reached 102.

The second important issue is preventive measures.

In addition to legal prosecutions, another threat to the freedom of press is the precautionary measures and decisions involving prevention of distribution, suspension of publication, seizure, banning of the entry to the country and distribution of publications. The first two of these measures are preliminary controls, in other words they represent censorship. Because, like printing, distribution and publication are inseparable parts of the freedom of press. For those bodies that are going to exercise the power of prevention of distribution and suspension of publication to learn beforehand and prevent what is to be published, is nothing but censorship.

In Turkey there was a monopoly of state radio and TV broadcasting until 1993. Despite this, at the beginning of the 1990s there took place a rapid proliferation of private radio and television stations.

The first step towards correcting the legal position and harmonising it with the de facto situation was taken with the amendment of Article 133 of the Constitution:

"F) Radio and television administration, and news agencies for the public

Article 133 - It shall be free to establish and manage radio and television stations in accordance with the conditions regulated by law.

The sole radio and television institution established by the State as a public corporate body, and news agencies receiving assistance from public corporate bodies, shall be autonomous and be impartial in their broadcasts."

***

The new provision is important from two viewpoints. The first of these is the abolition of the State monopoly in radio and TV broadcasting (Paragraph 1). The second is the renewed acceptance of the principle of "autonomy" in State radio and TV broadcasting.

The important step after the Constitutional amendment was the signing by Turkey of the European Convention on Cross-Frontier Broadcasting (7 September 1992) and the passing of the ratification law relating to this (3915 - 4.11.1993, Official Gazette 7.11.1993 - 21751).

The law on the Foundation and Broadcasts of Radio and Television Stations (3984 - 13.4.1994, Official Gazette 20.4.1994 - 21911) passed by reason of Amended Article 133 of the Constitution was the third and last stage to the present. The law regulates all public and private radio and TV broadcasts (Article 1 and 2) and, with this aim, establishes the "Radio and Television High Council (RTHC) having the character of an autonomous and impartial public corporate body." (Article 5). This council is made up of nine members, five selected by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey from candidates submitted by the governing party or parties and four from candidates submitted by the opposition parties (Article 6).

This election has been carried out in a controversial manner. Having the members of this council, who are meant to be "autonomous and impartial", elected by political parties is a fundamental and (possibly) permanent drawback. Similarly, the fact that those closer to the government wing (naturally) make up the majority is another drawback. It is probable that members will feel obliged to get on well with the parties that have elected them, since their positions are open to re-election. Moreover, the Turkish Radio and Television Corporate Body whose "autonomity" and "impartiality" is provided for by the Constitution, is subjected to the supervision of a council (RTHC) not provided by the Constitution, and whose autonomity and impartiality is doubtful from the start.

Law No. 3984 regulates the freedom of private enterprise in the field of audio-visual communication and of private radio and television stations. This law, which lays down their foundation as joint stock corporations, also prevents the monopolisation of the forces of domestic and foreign capital in this area in a way which would damage pluralism (Article 29). However, the same article which openes this sector in a limited way to private capital closes it to a section of democratic mass organisations and other groups in the following way: "Political parties, associations, trade unions, professional organisations, cooperatives, charitable foundations, local administrations etc.... shall not establish radio and television stations and shall not be partners in these."

From the viewpoint of freedom of visual and oral communication the fundamental question is how the system of supervision and sanction is to be established. A section of the "broadcasting principles" laid down by the law is made up of general and constitutional provisions (indivisibilty of the State, public morality, non-propagation of hatred and discrimination etc.); another section contains special and positive novelties such as freedom of expression, communication and broadcasting freedom and pluralism, justice and impartiality, equal opportunities for democratic groups and parties, not holding any person guilty unless this has been established by a judicial verdict etc. However, amongst these principles laid down in Article 4, there are also those whose necessity is debatable, such as "the national and spiritual values of the community", "the Turkish family structure" and "the general aims and basic principles of Turkish national education". The expectation that the educational moulds such as these designed for school children and young people would also work well for the adults through radio and TV broadcasting apparently sounds very convenient to a mentality which considers the people as immature.

In the law, a three-stage sanction system is provided under the heading "Sanctions": "Warning, suspension and cancellation." (Article 33). The High Council warns private radio and TV establishments that do not fulfil their