PERSPECTIVES ON DEMOCRATISATION IN TURKEY
PART 1 POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
POLITICAL DIMENSIONS
What is meant by the political dimensions of democratisation is the determination of the national will and the structuring of political power. Here, issues concerning political parties, which play a very important role in the functioning of democracy, will be discussed first (I). This is followed by "elections" (II) which means the manifestation of the national will, by the Grand National Assembly of Turkey (III), by the System of Government (IV), by the Issue of Civilianisation (V) and, finally, by Public Administration (VI).
I) POLITICAL PARTIES
Political parties have a central role in the functioning of representative democracy. Today, democracy is inconceivable without political parties. The Constitutions of 1961 and 1982 emphasize that parties are among the "indispensable" elements of democracy. The provisions concerning political parties appear in the Constitution and, particularly, in the Law on Political Parties (LPP) no. 2820 of 22 April 1983. The following survey and evaluation of legislation on this issue is based on the articles of the LPP.
1) Scope of the Law (LPP, Art. 2)
By the law no. 4121 of 23 July 1995, Article 69 of the Constitution was amended and the following provision was inserted in the third paragraph: "The auditing... of the conformity to law of the acquisition of assets by political parties, .... the methods of such auditing, and the sanctions to be applied in the event of unconformity, shall be regulated by law." This addition provides a further guarantee for political parties and also means a command to the legislature to rearrange this area by law.
Article 2 of the LPP, however, has the phrase "revenues and expenditures" in defining the scope of the law, but makes no mention of "acquisition of assets". This is normal because, at the time of making the law, the text of the Constitution did not include such a phrase. Now, "acquisition of assets" has been included in the Constitution, and it has become necessary to remove this gap in the law so as to make it conform to the Constitution. Therefore, the law should include also the concept of "acquisition of assets" which is a separate legal category from the concept of "revenues and expenditures" and which provides political parties with an additional guarantee. As a matter of fact, an amendment to that effect was proposed by Deniz Baykal and twenty-nine other MPs.
Proposal:
Therefore, the relevant provision would read as follows:
"Article 2 - This Law contains provisions for the formation, organization, activities, functions, powers and responsibilities of, the acquisition of assets by, and the auditing, cessation of activities and dissolution of political parties."
2) Definition of a political party (LPP, Art. 3)
The law currently defines a political party as follows:
"Article 3 - Political parties are organisations whose goal for the nation is to reach the level of contemporary civilisation within a democratic order of state and society by ensuring the formation of the national will..."
Of the two criteria included in the above wording, one is too narrow and the other completely unnecessary. The expression "ensuring the formation of the national will" is correct and appropriate but not sufficient. The former Law on Political Parties attributed a more effective role to political parties:
"Article 1/1: ... to direct, control and influence the social and State order and public affairs..."
The Constitutional Commission of the Consultative Assembly which was charged with drafting the 1982 Constitution adopted this wording in the former law. However, it was met with the reaction and disapproval of the General Assembly and did not find its way into the text of the law. In fact, from the viewpoint of the constitutional provision (Art. 68/2) which regards political parties among the indispensable elements of a democratic political system, it would have been more appropriate to retain the wording used in the former law.
Proposal:
The following words should be added to Article 3 of the LPP: "to direct, control and influence the social and State order and public affairs".
Article 3 of the LPP contains a totally unnecessary provision: ".... goal for the nation is to reach the level of contemporary civilisation..."
First of all, this is not a property or condition of being a political party. In no other country of the world is there such a provision, and its translation and reading in a foreign language could only cause amazement.
Moreover, it is not a legal concept or category; it does not have any positive content from the point of law. The said expression does not mean anything other than an ideological-political choice or wish. It is not appropriate to overload legal texts with such highly charged phrases.
Besides, defining political parties in the country as "aiming for the nation at reaching the level of contemporary civilisation" is against the principle of political and party pluralism. In the world of politics and political parties, the principle of pluralism exists so that different political world views may freely organise and compete for power. Parties may be in favour of modernisation and progress or may have conservative values and seek to make such values influential in the administration of the country within the limits of secular democracy. This is what party competition is, and this is what the "multi-party" system exists for. It is not right to force political parties to be hypocritical.
Proposal:
The words ".... goal for the nation is to reach the level of contemporary civilisation..." should be removed from the text of Article 3 of the LPP.
3) Indispensability and nature of political parties (LPP, Art. 4)
The relevant provision is as follows:
"Article 4: Political parties are the indispensable elements of democratic political life. They operate in loyalty to the principles and reforms of Atatürk."
The first sentence of the paragraph above is appropriate. It is simply a reiteration of the provision contained in the Constitution. The second sentence, however, is completely unnecessary and even dangerous. "To operate in loyalty to the principles and reforms of Atatürk" is related neither to the property of being a political party nor to the "indispensable" character of political parties; it is even alien to these.
Moreover, "the principles and reforms of Atatürk" are something whose legal content is difficult and even impossible to define. Let alone defining it in the legal sphere, there is no consensus even among historians on what those "principles" are, and it is very natural that there should not be. In order to see the diversity of opinion on this issue, it is enough to look at the textbooks on this subject.
The dangerous nature of this last point may be conceived as follows. If political parties are required "to operate in loyalty to the principles and reforms of Atatürk" and if, as many books or textbooks state, those principles include, say, "etatism" and "reformism", then will "liberal" or "conservative" parties not be violating the law?
In addition, "operating in loyalty to the principles and reforms of Atatürk" is a matter of ideological and political choice, and imposing it on all parties is once again contrary to the principles of ideological, political and party pluralism. For example, in its decision dissolving the "Huzur" Party, the Constitutional Court put forward as one of the reasons "the fact that the party has opposed Atatürk's ideas and the Turkish Revolution" (file no. 1983/2, decision no. 1983/2, dated 25 October 1983). A similar reason for dissolving a political party is impossible to be found in modern democracies. However, the Constitutional Court may argue that it was based on the law (LPP) in the said case. At least, the expression above gives the court this right.
There is another, more serious danger. This provision of the law goes much beyond forbidding political parties from engaging in activities against the principles and reforms of Atatürk (this prohibition is elsewhere; see Art. 84 and 85), but it actually imposes on them the obligation of "operating in loyalty" to those principles and reforms. We have to say that this represents an unacceptable, excessively oppresive mentality and arrangement.
Moreover, certain activities against the principles and reforms of Atatürk are already prohibited by the law, which contains detailed provisions protecting the principle of laicism, the essence of these principles and reforms. The expression we criticize serves no other purpose than forcing political parties and their members to act in a hypocritical way. Since it is far from having any legal value, it also goes counter to the principle that rights and freedoms may only be restricted by law.
Proposal:
The words "they operate in loyalty to the principles and reforms of Atatürk" should be removed from the text of the law.
4) Right to become a member and to resign from membership (LPP, Art. 6)
The second paragraph of Article 6 of the LPP reads as follows: "No one may be a member of more than one political party at a time. Otherwise, his/her membership of all the political parties shall be deemed to have terminated."
It is appropriate to disallow membership of more than one party at the same time. However, the sanction that is envisaged is too heavy, ignores the will and choice of the individual, and reflects a "penalising" mentality.
It is possible to take an approach that is more constructive and one that takes care of the individual. As a matter of fact, a bill of amendment drafted jointly by the True Path Party and the Social Democratic Party (26 May 1992) does contain a correct arrangement in that direction.
Proposal:
The last part of the paragraph should be amended to read: "Otherwise, the membership records prior to the most recent membership shall be considered null and void." Such a formulation would also agree with the provisions contained in the last paragraph of the same article.
5) Organisation of political parties (LPP, Art. 7)
"The organisation of a political party consists of its central organs, of its branch organisations in provinces, districts and sub-districts, of its group in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and of its groups in provincial general assemblies and in municipal assemblies."
This provision conformed to the Constitution before it was amended. Paragraph 6 of Article 68 of the Constitution before the amendment was as follows: "Political parties shall not........ organise and function abroad, shall not form discriminative auxiliary bodies such as women's or youth branches, nor shall they establish foundations." This restriction was abolished while the Constitution was amended in 1995. The law, however, dominated as it is by the old restrictive mentality, enumerates one by one and restricts the organs that a party may have. The organs enumerated do not include women's and youth branches and such units as village and ward organisations. The contrariness of the law to the new constitutional situation is obvious, and the law should therefore be made to conform to the Constitution as amended.
This could be achieved in two ways:
(a) In enumerating the organisations that a political party may have, "women's and youth branches", which have been made possible by the constitutional amendment, could be added, and this would make the article read as follows:
"The organisation of a political party includes its central organs, its branch organisations in provinces, districts and sub-districts, the women's branch, the youth branch and any other auxiliary bodies provided for in its statute, its group in the Grand National Assembly of Turkey, and its groups in provincial general assemblies and in municipal assemblies."
The amendment proposed by Deniz Baykal and other MPs are in that direction, except that the verb they use is "consist of" as is the case with the article of the law that is currently in force. However, after using an open-ended expression like "any other auxiliary bodies", the appropriate verb would be "include".
(b) As an alternative provision, concrete forms might be cited instead of the general expression of "any other auxiliary bodies". This was done in the proposal submitted by the True Path Party and the Social Democratic Party (on 26 May 1992) in these words: "Ward and village representations". However, such an elucidation or concretisation would obviously mean also a restriction and limitation. Therefore, it would be more appropriate to choose the phrase "any other auxiliary bodies" for the sake of not forcing party organisations to be uniform.
The last provision of Article 7 of the LPP is as follows: "Political parties shall not establish any organisations in any place and under any designation other than those mentioned in the preceding paragraph."
What should become of this paragraph? Should it be abolished?
In the text entitled "The laws that must be regulated in compliance with constitutional amendments" prepared by the Research and Study Office of the Laws and Decisions Directorate of the GNAT, it is stated that, as Article 68/6 of the Constitution has been abolished, the last provision of Article 7 of the LPP must also be abolished. The same view is adopted in the Motherland Party's "bills for securing harmonisation with constitutional amendments".
Since the relevant article of the Constitution as amended does not contain any restriction or command in this area, the opinions mentioned above are correct. From the perspective of democratisation, too, political parties should in principle be free to decide their own organisations themselves.
Proposal:
The last provision of Article 7 of the LPP should be abolished.
6) Formation of political parties (LPP, Art. 8)
According to this provision of the law, to be a founder of a political party, one is required to be eligible for membership of the parliament (Art. 8/1). Article 11 of the Law on the Election of Members of Parliament (LEMP) enumerates those who are not eligible for membership of the parliament as follows:
"f) Even if they have been pardoned, persons convicted of:
1. (....)
2. Any of the crimes stated in the first part of the Second Chapter of the Turkish Penal Code or the crime of publicly inciting the commission of any of those crimes;
3. The crime of openly inciting the people to hatred and animosity on grounds of class, race, religion, sect or region, which is provided for in Article 312 of the Turkish Criminal Code;
4. Committing for political and ideological purposes the acts stated in the first, second and third paragraphs of Article 536 of the Turkish Penal Code or the acts stated in the first to fifth paragraphs of Article 537 thereof."
The first part of the Second Chapter of the TCC is entitled Offenses Against the Personality of the State (Art. 125 to 173) and includes disclosure of news the publication of which has been prohibited (Art. 137), establishing or joining international organisations without permission (Art. 143), receiving decorations or salaries from hostile states (Art. 144), failure to report sedition to official authorities (Art. 151), engaging in publications that would endanger the security of the country (Art. 155), insulting and cursing the President (Art. 158), deriding the constitutional agencies and public personalities (Art. 159), political and economic sedition (Art. 161), transportation of criminal publications (Art. 162), and crimes committed against foreign states and their presidents and diplomatic envoys (Art. 164 to 167). As for Articles 536 and 537 of the TCC, they concern such crimes as posting placards, bills, posters, etc. without permission, writing on the walls, and destroying public notices.
People who have committed any of these crimes shall neither be eligible for membership of the parliament nor can become founders of a political party, regardless of whether they have been pardoned later on. In addition to these prohibitions, Provisional Article 4 of the 1982 Constitution imposed a ban on certain politicians to establish political parties.
What has been the practice? What can be proposed to improve the situation?
The wording of this prohibitive legislation raised the possibility that the pre-1983 period might also be affected. Based on the letter of the arrangements in question, it was argued that those who had been convicted of the above-mentioned crimes before 1983 could not become founders of political parties even if they have been pardoned. This was prevented by the Constitutional Court through an appropriate interpretation (File no: 1989/5-Political party warning, Decision no: 1990/1, dated 22.1.1990, The Official Gazette, 4 April 1990, no. 20482). This is the first favourable development.
The second step of democratisation in this area was taken through the referandum held on 6 September 1987 which abolished Provisional Article 4 of the Constitution which imposed certain prohibitions. In this way, the political bans on certain politicians, and in particular the ban on them to form political parties, were lifted.
The third change which led to further democratisation took place with the abolition, through the Anti-Terrorism Act of 12 April 1991, of certain crimes in the Turkish Criminal Code, namely those in Articles 140, 141, 142 and 163.
In spite of these improvements, the remaining body of bans continues to exist. Of these bans, those which concern freedom of expression (TCC Articles 155, 158, 159, 311 and 312) and non-violent actions such as posting placards and bills particularly disturb the public conscience.
Moreover, the expression "even if pardoned" shakes the feelings of law and justice, because a "pardon" is, as a rule, an act that nullifies the punishment with all its consequences.
However, the problem here does not arise from laws only. The 1982 Constitution itself is the origin of these anti-democratic arrangements. According to the Constitution, "persons who have been convicted of disclosing state secrets, of involvement in ideological or anarchistic activities or of incitement and encouragement of such activities shall not be elected as deputies, even if they have been pardoned" (Art. 76/2). Therefore, they may not be founders of political parties, either (LPP, Art. 8/1).
Proposal:
The words "disclosure of state secrets, involvement in ideological or anarchistic activities or incitement and encouragement of such activities" in the Constitution (Art. 76/2), and the paragraphs 2,3 and 4 of Art. 11/f of the LEMP, should be deleted. If the LEMP is amended in this way, there will be no harm in retaining the provision of Article 8/1 of the LPP.
7) Supervision of the formation of political parties by the Chief Public Prosecutor (LPP Art. 8/final p. and Art. 9)
The law requires that the notification of formation of a political party, and the document of receipt, should be sent also to the Office of Chief Public Prosecutor (Art. 8/final p.). The Office of Chief Public Prosecutor is authorized to examine and supervise the formation of a political party (Art. 9). These provisions were based on paragraph 5 of Article 69 of the Constitution before it was amended and were therefore in conformity with the Constitution. The said paragraph was as follows:
"Article 69 - (.....)
The Office of Chief Public Prosecutor shall examine, with priority, the conformity of the statutes and programmes of new parties and the status of their founders to the the Constitution and law; and it shall also follow their activities" (Paragraph 5).
The constitutional amendments of 1995 have removed these provisions and deprived the Office of Chief Public Prosecutor of the power to supervise. This is a progressive and democratic novelty. However, it has made the provisions of the LPP contrary to the Constitution. This power to examine belongs to the Constitutional Court alone, within the framework set out in the Constitution and law. Nevertheless, to bring an action for the dissolution of a political party, the Office of Chief Public Prosecutor may always request the necessary information and documents from the said court or directly from the party concerned.
Proposal:
To ensure conformity with the constitutional amendments, it is essential to remove the words "the Office of Chief Public Prosecutor and" from the last paragraph of Article 8 of the LPP and to abolish the provisions of Article 9.
This is also pointed out in the proposal submitted by Deniz Baykal and the other MPs.
8) Register of political parties (LPP, Art. 10)
The former LPP (Art. 7) provided as follows: "At the Constitutional Court, a register shall be kept of political parties. The documents and information to be included in the register of political parties and how this register is to be kept shall be set out in the rules of procedure of the Constitutional Court. This register shall be open to all." The supplementary article 1 of the said Rules of Procedure enumerated the information to be included in the register as follows: the name of the party, its address, its central organs, its provincial organisations and its statute, programme and internal regulations. There was no obligation to furnish and request any other information. These provisions did not damage the right and principle of "freely carrying out activities" as provided for in the 1961 Constitution.
On the other hand, the LPP of 1983 which is currently in force has taken the duty of keeping the register from the independent judiciary and given it over to the Office of Chief Public Prosecutor. In addition, it provides (Art. 10) that "all kinds of regulations and other publications that regulate the activities of the party", the full identities of all its members and of the officials who are on the central and peripheral organs, and "other information and documents" which the Office of Chief Public Prosecutor may demand, shall also be recorded in the register.
These provisions, which require that the state be notified of almost everything and all sorts of publications, from the "full identities" of all the party members to intraparty communications and resolutions, including the party documents concerning political tactics and objectives (which should be secret), are dangerous for all parties, but particularly so for those which are in opposition or which represent political minorities.
The fact that the state knows everything about political parties with no privacy left implies that political parties are regarded as part of the state, not of civil society. Thus, the state demands, with no right at all, from organisations of civil society the openness and transparency that is expected from itself, but one which it often does not display.
The constitutional amendments of 1995 have changed this picture, putting an end to the duty and power of the Office of Chief Public Prosecutor to examine and monitor political parties. Now, the authority of examination is none other than the Constitutional Court. However, the law itself continues unchanged and creates an unconstitutional situation.
Proposal:
It is essential to change the provisions that concern the register of parties (LPP, Art. 10), to remove the words related to the Office of Chief Public Prosecutor from the text, and to replace them with references to the Constitutional Court. It would also be appropriate to limit the range of information and documents that may be demanded for the register of parties and to narrow it down to the stipulations of the former legislation.
9) Becoming a member of a political party (LPP, Art. 11)
The first problem in this area concerns the minimum age of membership.
Through the amendment of the first paragraph of Article 68 of the Constitution by the law no. 4121 of 23 July 1995, the minimum age of membership of a political party has been reduced from 21 to 18. However, the necessary harmonisation has not been carried out; the age-limit in the LPP remains 21.
Proposal:
The words "who has completed the age of twenty-one" in Article 11/1 of the LPP should be replaced with the words "who has completed the age of eighteen".
The second and really wide-ranging problem in the area of membership of political parties concerns the prohibitions on membership.
The primary issue here is again that of harmonisation. The constitutional amendments of 1995 enable members of the teaching staff and students in institutions of higher education to join political parties, but these amendments are yet to be incorporated into the law.
Moreover, the LPP imposes broader bans on membership than the Constitution does. Although the Constitution clearly enumerates and limits the bans on membership, the LPP goes further and denies the right to join a political party also to the managers, auditors and officers of banks and organisations established by a special law, those who are on the central boards of associations working for the public interest, those who have been convicted of the crimes set out in the first part of the Second Chapter of the Turkish Criminal Code or for publicly inciting the commission of such crimes, those who have been convicted for the offence of incitement in Article 312 of the TCC and those who have been convicted for committing for political and ideological reasons the offences of posting placards, bills, posters, etc. which are set out in Articles 536 and 537 of the TCC.
While the provisions in the LEMP that limit eligibility for membership of the parliament do have a basis, even if abstract, in the Constitution (Art. 76/2), the restrictions imposed by the LPP on becoming founders or members of a political party are not grounded in the Constitution. At any rate, it is not possible to make such an inference from the relevant articles. However, Provisional Article 15 of the Constitution does not allow this unconstitutionality to be considered by the judiciary, and/or the Constitutional Court has avoided considering this question, in effect regarding the said Article as "permanent" rather than provisional.
The fact that the said provisions of the LPP may not be regarded as unconstitutional does not mean that they may not be amended. The Constitution does not have any obstacles to the adoption of the amendments proposed below.
Proposal:
Article 11 of the LPP should be rearranged as follows:
"Article 11 - Every Turkish citizen who has completed the age of eighteen and who has the capacity of excercising civil and political rights may become a member of a political party.
However:
(a) Judges and public prosecutors, members of higher judicial organs including those of the Audit Court, civil servants in public institutions and organisations, other public servants who are not considered to be labourers by virtue of the services they perform, members of the Armed Forces, and students who are not yet in higher education institutions, shall not become members of political parties.
Members of the teaching staff at institutions of higher education shall be exempt from the prohibitions to which civil servants are subject. However, they shall not assume responsibilities outside the central organs of the political parties."
(b)
1. The current provision regarding "those who are banned from public service" should be retained.
2. The current provision regarding "those who have been convicted for dishonourable offences such as embezzlement, corruption, bribery, theft, fraud, forgery, breach of trust and fraudulent bankruptcy, and persons convicted of smuggling, of conspiracy in official bids or purchases, or of disclosure of state secrets" may be retained.
3. The current provision regarding "those who have been sentenced to a prison term of three years or more excluding involuntary offences, or to a heavy imprisonment for any offence" may be retained.
4. The sub-paragraph "those who have been convicted of any of the offences set out in the first part of the Second Chapter of the Turkish Criminal Code or for publicly inciting the commission of those offences" should be removed from the law.
5. The sub-paragraph "those who have been convicted for committing for political and ideological reasons the acts stated in the first, second and third paragraphs of Article 536 of the Turkish Criminal Code or the acts stated in the first to fifth paragraphs of Article 537 of the same" should be removed from the law.
10) Central, provincial and district organisations (LPP, Art. 13 to 21)
In political parties in Turkey, there is a "problem of intraparty democracy". Leadership dominance or leadership oligarchy is a phenomenon observed in many parties. The number of active members is small, and people who are members on paper are indifferent. The difficulty and even the impossibility of changing the leader and the leadership, coupled with weak intraparty democracy, leave opponents usually with no choice other than resigning from the party. The only serious alternative is expulsion. These conditions cause a steady rise in the number of parties and contribute to the political fragmentation and instability prevailing in the country.
Here, the question that should be asked with regard to our subject-matter is this: Does the LPP play a part in the lack of democracy inside the party? When the relevant provisions of the LPP are reviewed, one cannot easily say "yes" to this question. The situation may be better examined by considering a critical problem related to intraparty democracy.
One of the most troublesome areas with respect to democracy within the parties is the fact that party organisations are from time to time dissolved, or their officials removed, by the central office. As a requirement of party discipline and even of the concept of political party, it is normal that such a power should be available. The question is simply this: Are the arrangements that are provided in the LPP such as to corrupt democracy?
Articles 19/5 and 20/9 of the LPP recognise that members of provincial and district committees may be removed by the central office and leave the question of how this will be done to the statutes of political parties. However, both the said articles of the law and the ninth paragraph of Article 20 thereof which concerns district party committees provide that the decision of such removal must be taken by the authorized party organ by secret vote and by at least two thirds of the full number of members on that organ. Likewise, the law stipulates the period within which the provincial or district congress must convene and elect the new committee.
These arrangements cannot be considered anti-democratic. To the contrary, they provide some measure of democratic guarantee. Therefore, it seems more appropriate to look for the causes of the problem of intraparty democracy within political life in general rather than in any adverse consequences of the law or in any failure of it to provide guarantees.
The existence, the absence, or the insufficiency of intraparty democracy appears to be not a legal issue but one which is related to political culture and maturity. Many factors beyond the province of law such as the level of political maturity, the ideological and political tendency of the party, the social composition of its members, etc. have a part in the emergence of this problem. Therefore, it is not correct to consider law to be the main cause of the absence of intraparty democracy, just as it would be wrong to think that law can provide magic solutions.
For this reason, we believe that the current provisions concerning the central and provincial organisations of political parties do not contain any aspect that have directly adverse effects on intraparty democracy. However, a proposal on another issue concerning intraparty democracy, namely on the "determination of candidates".
11) Designation of party candidates (LPP, Art. 37)
With respect to the designation of party candidates for elections, the law stipulates various methods such as central nomination and selection by local party organizations. It should be noted that the law requires the selection procedure to be open to all local party members. However, the law does not make it compulsory to carry out local nomination. So, a political party may determine its candidates using one or several of the methods available.
In our opinion, it would be useful with respect to the designation of party candidates to require that a certain proportion of the candidates be determined by the method of selection. In fact, the first paragraph of Article 69 (as amended) of the Constitution states: "The activities, internal regulations and operations of political parties shall be in accordance with democratic principles. The implementation of these principles shall be regulated by law." This shows that the Constitution imposes on the legislature an active duty to ensure and achieve intraparty democracy. A legal requirement to the effect that local nomination must be used in the determination of a certain proportion of candidates would be in accordance with the Constitution.
Proposal: Article 37/3 of the LPP should be supplemented as follows:
"Parties shall carry out selections by local party organizations in at least ..... percent of the electoral constituencies in which they take part in elections."
12) Prohibitions (LPP, Art. 78 to 97)
Part Four of the LPP which is entitled "Prohibitions Concerning Political Parties" gives a frightening list. In no democratic country can there be anything similar. Most of the prohibitions are of the nature of duplications. Since 1971, the Constitutional Court has made more than ten decisions of dissolution based on the ideological framework to which political parties must conform, excluding issues of procedure and form. It is again impossible to see anything similar in pluralist democracies.
The constitutional amendments made in 1995 provide certain relaxations. However, these are yet to be reflected in the LPP. The criticisms and proposals made below contain issues concerning the adjustment of the law so as to have it conform to the Constitution as amended.
The arrangements of pluralistic-liberal democracies that concern political parties must keep ideological prohibitions at a minimum.
What are the provisions of the LPP which most blatantly go counter to the idea of democratic society and to the new provisions of the Constitution?
